Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 105 | Issue 4

Article 5

Fall 2015

The Chronic Failure to Discipline Prosecutors for
Misconduct: Proposals for Reform
Thomas P. Sullivan
Maurice Possley

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminology Commons
Recommended Citation
Thomas P. Sullivan and Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology (2015).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol105/iss4/5

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

5. SULLIVAN FINAL TO PRINTER

11/29/2016 6:53 PM

0091-4169/15/1054-0881
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2016 by Thomas P. Sullivan and Maurice Possley

Vol. 105, No. 4
Printed in U.S.A.

THE CHRONIC FAILURE TO DISCIPLINE
PROSECUTORS FOR MISCONDUCT:
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
THOMAS P. SULLIVAN* & MAURICE POSSLEY**
While most prosecutors adhere to the maxim that their primary task is
to obtain just results, there are some who violate their ethical responsibilities
in order to rack up convictions. This article describes the distressing,
decades-long absence of discipline imposed on prosecutors whose knowing
misconduct has resulted in terrible injustices being visited upon defendants
throughout the country. Many honorable lawyers have failed to speak out
about errant prosecutors, thus enabling their ethical breaches. The silent
accessories include practicing lawyers and judges of trial and reviewing
courts who, having observed prosecutorial misconduct, failed to take
corrective action. Fault also lies with members of attorney disciplinary
bodies who have not investigated widely publicized prosecutorial
misconduct. This article summarizes the rules requiring all members of the
bar to report unethical conduct. We focus particularly on lawyers who serve
in prosecutors’ offices, defense lawyers, and trial and reviewing court judges
and their lawyer clerks, each of whom has a personal, non-delegable
responsibility to report their knowledge of ethical breaches to disciplinary
authorities.
In addition, the article identifies reforms to the justice system designed
to reduce prosecutorial abuses: (1) substituting for the Brady rule a
verifiable open-file pretrial discovery requirement on prosecutors; (2)
instead of invoking harmless error, requiring reversal of convictions if

* Partner, Jenner & Block, Chicago, 1954–present, except July 1977 to April 1981, when
he served as United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. Thanks to Jo Stafford
and Ginger R. Wiley for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
** Journalist and senior researcher for the National Registry of Exonerations.
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serious prosecutorial misconduct is proven; (3) identifying errant
prosecutors by name in trial and appellate opinions; (4) providing
prosecutors with qualified instead of complete immunity from civil damages
for misconduct; and (5) authorizing the Department of Justice’s Office of
Inspector General to handle investigations of alleged misconduct by federal
prosecutors. The article also proposes that attorney disciplinary bodies
adopt changes designed to more effectively discover and sanction
misbehaving prosecutors. Lawyer organizations and bar associations are
urged to speak out when prosecutors deviate from appropriate conduct, and
law schools are encouraged to include instruction on ethical rules peculiar
to the criminal practice.
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INTRODUCTION
The authors of this article have extensive experience with the criminal
justice systems, state and federal. Possley is a Pulitzer Prize-winning
journalist1 with more than forty years of experience and the co-author of two
surveys, cited infra, which revealed extensive prosecutorial misconduct in
Chicago and California that had gone unpunished.2 Sullivan has practiced law
in Chicago for over sixty years, chiefly in civil and criminal litigation,
including service for a brief period as a federal prosecutor. We believe that
most prosecutors adhere to the precept that their primary function is not to
obtain convictions, but to see that justice is done; hence, the threat of
sanctions is not needed to persuade them to comply with their ethical
obligations. Unfortunately, there are a few rogue prosecutors who flout the
rules of professional conduct and bring our criminal justice system into

1
The 2008 Pulitzer Prize Winners: Investigative Reporting, THE PULITZER PRIZES,
http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2008-Investigative-Reporting (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
2
KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA, 1997–2009, A VERITAS INITIATIVE REPORT 16
(2010), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ncip
pubs; Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice
to Win. Part 1: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 1999), http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial1-story.html.
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disrepute. The writings cited in this article—which span four decades—have
identified and bemoaned this problem, but few have attempted—as we do in
this article—to set forth a comprehensive series of practical proposals
designed to identify and weed out the small, but insidious, group of
miscreants, and to prevent future acts of prosecutorial misconduct.3
We have divided our article into three parts:4 Part I contains a review of
the evidence that has accumulated over the past several decades and reveals
an almost complete lack of discipline of errant prosecutors. Part II contains a
summary of the rules that apply to all members of the bar, including judges,
and require them to report serious lawyer misconduct to disciplinary bodies.
In Part III, we set out our recommendations for reforms, which are directed
to judges, prosecutors, state and federal disciplinary authorities and
legislatures, organizations that promulgate codes of conduct for judges and
lawyers, organizations that represent judges and lawyers, and law schools.
I. LACK OF DISCIPLINE FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
The failure to punish prosecutors who engage in misconduct is not a
recent phenomenon. To the contrary, it has been well known for many
decades, as illustrated in the surveys and articles summarized below,
prepared by those who have studied relevant cases and disciplinary systems.5
We begin in Part A with a few of the many cases in which misconduct
was discovered but went unpunished. In Part B we cite surveys and articles
that have called attention to this situation.

3
We do not mean to imply that violation of legal professional rules occurs only on the
prosecution side of criminal prosecutions. There are of course defense lawyers who do not
comply with the rules of professional conduct, and much contained in this article is applicable
to them as well.
4
To simplify, we have used the masculine pronoun throughout.
5
Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently made these cogent
observations:

While most prosecutors are fair and honest, a legal environment that tolerates sharp prosecutorial
practices gives important and undeserved career advantages to prosecutors who are willing to step
over the line, tempting others to do the same. Having strict rules that prosecutors must follow will
thus not merely avoid the risk of letting a guilty man free to commit other crimes while an innocent
one languishes his life away, it will also preserve the integrity of the prosecutorial process by
shielding principled prosecutors from unfair competition from their less principled colleagues.

Hon. Alex Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxvi (2015)
(forthcoming), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/06/Kozinski_Preface.pdf.
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A. EXAMPLES OF CASES INVOLVING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
WITH NO RESULTING DISCIPLINE

The reality of prosecutorial misconduct is best illustrated through the
facts of specific cases, so we have gathered and summarized a few below.6
In none of these cases was the prosecutor disciplined.
After serving as a prosecutor in the Cuyahoga County District
Attorney’s office in Cleveland, Ohio, for thirty years, Carmen Marino retired
in 2002.7 Over those three decades, Marino prosecuted scores of cases and
racked up many convictions. Marino attributed his success to jurors, who he
said were inclined to trust law enforcement and distrust defendants who did
not testify in their trials.8 Upon Marino’s retirement, the Cuyahoga County
District Attorney began giving an annual award, christened the Carmen
Marino Award, to a prosecutor in the office for “integrity and professionalism
in the pursuit of justice.”9
Six years later, however, the award was renamed Prosecutor of the Year
Award because Marino’s name had come to represent the worst—not the
best—attributes of a prosecutor.10 Many of the convictions he obtained
unraveled because of his misconduct: failing to disclose key pieces of
evidence to defendants before trial; allowing prosecution witnesses to lie at
trial;11 and delivering improper, prejudicial closing arguments.12

6
These cases are taken from the National Registry of Exonerations, maintained at the
University of Michigan School of Law, which contains details of the cases involving more
than 1,800 defendants whose convictions have been overturned. Many of the cases involve
prosecutors who violated their ethical responsibilities, but in only a few were disciplinary
measures taken. The National Registry of Exonerations, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH.,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Jun. 8, 2016).
7
Regina Brett, County Prosecutor Bill Mason Should Retire Carmen Marino Award,
PLAIN DEALER (Oct. 03, 2008, 8:29 P.M.), http://www.cleveland.com/brett/blog/index.ssf/
2008/09/regina_brett_county_prosecutor.html.
8
William Dawson, in his book The Legal Matrix, quoted Marino discussing his success
as a prosecutor: “Marino said it’s not difficult to win convictions in Ohio, as jurors are
predisposed to find defendants guilty because they trust police and prosecutors. ‘If the person
doesn’t take the stand, the jury knows he is guilty,’ Marino said. ‘That’s my experience.’”
WILLIAM DAWSON, THE LEGAL MATRIX 68 (2008).
9
Brett, supra note 7.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Radley Balko, Sorry About Your Time on Death Row, Pal, Nothing We Can Do, WASH.
POST (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/02/sorryabout-your-time-on-death-row-pal-nothing-we-can-do/.
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In 2003, the Center for Public Integrity, in a nationwide survey of
prosecutorial misconduct from 1970 through 2002, reported that five of
Marino’s convictions had been overturned by Ohio reviewing courts.13 After
Marino retired in 2002, the reversals kept coming. In 2004, a federal court
cited ten cases in which Ohio state courts found Marino had engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct.14
One of the most notable of Marino’s reversals was the case involving
Joseph D’Ambrosio, who was convicted of murder in 1989 and sentenced to
death.15 The Ohio reviewing courts affirmed D’Ambrosio’s conviction and
sentence,16 and D’Ambrosio’s state post-conviction petition for relief was
denied.17 In March 2001, D’Ambrosio filed a federal petition for writ of
habeas corpus based in part on a claim that Marino failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence.18 In 2006, following an evidentiary hearing, a federal
judge granted the petition based upon findings that D’Ambrosio was denied
due process by the prosecution’s failure to apprise him of exculpatory and
impeachment evidence, including evidence that pointed to an alternative
suspect with a strong motive to kill the victim. The judge ordered the state to
either dismiss the charges or conduct another trial within 180 days.19 The
warden appealed.20 In 2008, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that there was
a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of D’Ambrosio’s trial would
have been different had the prosecution not suppressed evidence.21 The
suppressed evidence would have both weakened the prosecution’s case and
strengthened D’Ambrosio’s position that someone else committed the
murder.22
Disputes ensued concerning additional exculpatory evidence not
previously disclosed to D’Ambrosio’s lawyer. In 2010, after several state

13

CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S LOCAL
PROSECUTORS i (2003) [hereinafter CPI].
14
In re Lott, 366 F.3d 431, 433 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004).
15
State v. D’Ambrosio, 652 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1995).
16
Id. at 712, 716.
17
State v. D'Ambrosio, No. 75076, 2000 WL 283079, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2000),
appeal dismissed sua sponte, 731 N.E.2d 1140 (Ohio 2000).
18
D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, No. 1:00 CV 2521, 2006 WL 1169926, at *10 (N.D. Ohio, Mar.
24, 2006).
19
Id. at *1.
20
D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 527 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 2008).
21
Id. at 499.
22
Id.
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court proceedings related to D’Ambrosio’s retrial and other federal court
proceedings,23 U.S. District Judge Kathleen McDonald O’Malley ordered the
state not to retry D’Ambrosio.24 She lamented prosecutors’ improper
withholding of evidence that tended to raise questions of D’Ambrosio’s
guilt.25 The judge said that the state’s testimony “only can be described as
‘strain[ing] credulity,’ and showing startling indifference to D’Ambrosio’s
rights.”26
The Sixth Circuit affirmed.27 D’Ambrosio was released from prison
after serving more than twenty years on Ohio’s Death Row.28 His
subsequently filed federal suit for damages against Cuyahoga County was
dismissed, although the judge acknowledged the prosecutors “trampled upon
D’Ambrosio’s constitutional rights.”29
And the hits keep on coming. In March 2015, Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas Judge Nancy Russo ordered a new trial for Eugene Johnson,
Derrick Wheatt, and Laurese Glover, each of whom had spent nearly twenty
years in prison for a murder in East Cleveland.30 Judge Russo found that
Marino intentionally withheld a trove of exculpatory evidence in the case,
and at one point had written a letter to the East Cleveland police department
ordering department officials to conceal all police reports and other

23

See D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 619 F. Supp. 2d 428, 433–45 (N.D. Ohio 2009);
D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 688 F. Supp. 2d 709, 713 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
24
D’Ambrosio, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
25
Id. at 727.
26
Id. at 728. The judge also stated:
For 20 years, the State held D’Ambrosio on death row, despite wrongfully withholding evidence
that “would have substantially increased a reasonable juror’s doubt of D’Ambrosio’s guilt.” . . .
[C]ertain of the State’s counsel baselessly attacked the state trial judge, came before this Court and
supplied testimony that, charitably, only can be described as “strain[ing] credulity,” and showing
startling indifference to D’Ambrosio’s rights.

Id. at 727–28.
27
D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 656 F.3d 379, 390 (6th Cir. 2011).
28
Regina Brett, Former Death Row Inmate Joe D’Ambrosio, Finally Free, Speaks Out,
PLAIN DEALER (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.cleveland.com/brett/blog/index.ssf/2012/
01/joe_dambrosio_finally_free_spe.html.
29
D'Ambrosio v. Marino, No. 1:11 CV 933, 2013 WL 256312, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 23,
2013), aff'd, 747 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 758, 190 L. Ed. 2d 628
(2014).
30
Monica Robins, Judge Grants New Trial for 3 Men Imprisoned for Murder, WKYC-TV
(Mar. 26, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://www.wkyc.com/story/news/local/cuyahoga-county/
2015/03/26/innocence-project-judge-nancy-russo-derrick-wheatt-laurese-glover-eugenejohnson/70484508//.
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information relating to the investigation.31 In rendering her decision, Judge
Russo stated, “Marino is infamous in Cuyahoga County for his vindictive,
unprofessional and outrageous misconduct in criminal cases.” 32
Despite this litany of misconduct, the Ohio State Bar has never publicly
disciplined Carmen Marino.33
Ohio is not alone. An Arizona man convicted of assaulting police
officers when resisting arrest was exonerated after excessive force reports
surfaced, suggesting that the officers may have beaten the twenty-three-yearold man.34 In California, two defendants who had been convicted of murder
based on identifications from two witnesses had their convictions overturned
after one of the defendants uncovered that the police concealed evidence that

31
Opinion on Motion for New Trial at 2, 5, Ohio v. Johnson, CR 95-324431 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. Mar. 26, 2015), http://cpdocket.cp.cuyahogacounty.us/DisplayImageList.aspx?q
=wXHMV_TgVTGXBbjf_x30fvRTNBNuueZz0.
32
Brief of Appellant at 12, Ohio v. Johnson, CR-102828 (Ohio Ct. App. July 1, 2015)
(quoting Transcript of Trial Court Proceedings from Mar. 26, 2015 at 4),
http://cpdocket.cp.cuyahogacounty.us/COA_CaseInformation_Summary.aspx?q=KAa3MW
q76t4IB84YpHxuvg2. Judge Russo lamented Marino’s work in office, stating: “[T]he human
toll that has resulted from [Marino’s] tenure in our county’s office of the prosecutor is
incalculable and never-ending.” Id. (quoting same at 5).
33
THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY SERVS., Attorney Information,
Carmen Michael Marino, http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/AttySvcs/AttyReg/Public_
AttorneyDetails.asp?ID=0001617 (last visited Aug. 18, 2015). Marino is also still listed as an
active attorney allowed to practice law. Id.
34
Order Vacating Judgment and Convictions at 4–5, Arizona v. Lewis, CR20120036
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Lewis Order], http://www.gilacountyaz.gov/
government/courts/docs/media/FINALVacatingJudgmentConvictions.pdf. In Oct. 2011,
twenty three-year-old Brandon Lewis was charged with assaulting three police officers in
Payson, Arizona. Id. at 2. Lewis alleged that the officers said he violently resisted their efforts
to administer a breathalyzer test. Complaint at 2, Lewis v. Town of Payson, No. CV201200175 (Ariz. Super. Ct. July 13, 2012). Lewis was treated for a fractured eye socket, a torn ear
lobe, and bruises and abrasions to his arms and knees, id. at 3, which the officers said were
self-inflicted when he slammed his head into the hood of his vehicle. Answer of Town of
Payson at 6, Lewis v. Town of Payson, No. CV2012-00175 (Gila Cty. Super. Ct. Aug. 7,
2012). Lewis was convicted, but later exonerated after excessive force reports were
discovered. Lewis Order at 10. The reports, which had been concealed by police, revealed
inconsistencies with the officers’ testimony, raising the possibility that Lewis did not resist
and had been severely beaten by the officers. Id. at 5. The reports also contained the names of
witnesses whose identities had not been disclosed to Lewis’s defense attorney. Id. at 3. In
vacating Lewis’s conviction in 2013, a Gila County Superior Court Judge declared, “It is an
injustice that so many important and legally relevant documents were not properly disclosed
prior to trial.” Id. at 10.
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a witness had recanted and that law enforcement had paid the witnesses for
their participation.35
Illinois has a particularly long and sorry record when it comes to
prosecutorial misconduct. A murder defendant whose conviction was secured
in large part by one piece of evidence—a pair of shorts supposedly stained
with blood consistent with the eight-year-old victim’s type36—was released
twelve years after his conviction, when he showed that the stain actually was
paint.37 The prosecutor knew at the time of trial that the stain was not blood.38
Four men convicted of a 1992 double murder were ultimately exonerated and
had their convictions vacated after the Illinois Attorney General’s Office
discovered a prosecutor’s handwritten notes showing that police officers who
testified against one of the defendants knew the defendant had been in lockup

35
Tennison v. San Francisco, 548 F.3d 1293, 1296, 1298 (9th Cir. 2008). On August 19,
1989, after a car and foot chase through the streets of San Francisco, California, Roderick
Shannon was shot to death in the parking lot of a convenience store. Id. at 1296. This occurred
as public pressure mounted over more than forty gang-related killings that summer. Maurice
Possley, Antoine Goff, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Jan.
23, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=
3241. Antoine Goff, 19, and John Tennison, 17, were charged with the murder. Id. No physical
evidence linked them to the crime. Id. They were convicted in San Francisco County Superior
Court based upon identifications provided by two young women who said they saw the
shooting. Id. Tennison was sentenced to twenty five years to life and Goff to twenty seven
years to life. Id. Both men lost their appeals in the California reviewing courts. Id. Years later,
in 2003, a federal judge held a hearing on Tennison’s petition for habeas corpus, and
overturned his conviction based upon what she learned about the original investigation, none
of which was disclosed to the defense lawyers at the original trial: During the pretrial police
investigation, one of the girls recanted her identification; she was then given a polygraph,
which was inconclusive, then put on the telephone with the other girl, and then interviewed by
the prosecutor, whereupon she reverted to her original identification. Id. The girls were paid
$2,500. Id. A man told the police he was involved in the shooting, but later recanted. Id. The
state dismissed the charges, and Goff and Tennison sued the City of San Francisco, which
settled collectively for $7.5 million. Id.
36
People v. Miller, 148 N.E.2d 455, 458 (Ill. 1958).
37
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 5 (1967). In 1955, Miller was convicted and sentenced to
death for the murder of an eight-year-old girl. Id. at 2. A major item of evidence was a pair of
shorts found in an abandoned building a mile from the scene of the crime, which contained
reddish-brown stains. Id. at 6. A chemist for the State Bureau of Crime Identification testified
the stains were blood, consistent with the girl’s type. Id. at 3–4. It was later determined that
the prosecutor was aware the stains were paint, not blood. Id. at 5. In 1967, the United States
Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus, saying, “[t]he prosecution deliberately
misrepresented the truth.” Id. at 6. Miller was released after serving twelve years. See MICHAEL
RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 141–52 (1992).
38
Miller, 386 U.S. at 6.
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at the time of the murder.39 A man convicted of a 1995 murder and sentenced
to fifty years was released thirteen years later after showing that the state’s
attorney’s office knowingly withheld exculpatory evidence.40
B. SURVEYS AND ARTICLES ILLUSTRATING LACK OF DISCIPLINE OF
ERRANT PROSECUTORS

Studies of prosecutorial misconduct in criminal proceedings, many of
which are cited below in this section, agree that courts rarely discipline
prosecutors for misconduct. One of the leading sources of information about
prosecutorial misconduct is Pace University Law School Professor Bennett
L. Gershman’s text, Professional Misconduct.41 In the first and second
39

Maurice Possley, Daniel Taylor, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS (June 24, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/case
detail.aspx?caseid=4212. Daniel Taylor, Deon Patrick, Akia Phillips, and Lewis Gardner were
indicted and convicted for the 1992 murder of a man and woman in Chicago. Id. All confessed
to being involved in the crimes. Id. Almost immediately, Taylor repudiated his confession,
claiming he was in the jail at the time of the murders. Id. Gardner and Phillips were sentenced
to thirty years in prison, and Patrick and Taylor to life without parole. Id. While postconviction proceedings were underway, members of the Illinois Attorney General’s office
discovered in the State’s Attorney’s files handwritten notes of an assistant state’s attorney,
which revealed that seven police officers—two of whom had testified at Taylor’s trial—
confirmed that Taylor was in the lockup at the time of the murders. Id. This disclosure
unraveled the convictions of all four defendants. Id. Eventually, with the concurrence of the
State’s Attorney, Taylor was judicially exonerated and released in June 2013. Id. Patrick was
similarly exonerated and released in January 2014, and not long afterward the convictions of
Gardner and Phillips—who were released on parole in 2007—were vacated and the charges
dismissed. Id.
40
People v. Beaman, 890 N.E.2d 500, 502 (Ill. 2008). In 1995, Alan Beaman was
convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty years in prison in McLean County, Illinois. Id. In
2008, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the State’s Attorney knowingly withheld
exculpatory evidence relating to an alternative suspect from Beaman’s defense lawyers. Id. at
511. After analyzing the facts, the Illinois Supreme Court said:
We conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been
different if petitioner had presented the evidence [of] . . . an alternative suspect. We cannot have
confidence in the verdict finding petitioner guilty of this crime given the tenuous nature of the
circumstantial evidence against him, along with the nondisclosure of critical evidence that would
have countered the state’s argument that all other potential suspects had been eliminated from
consideration. Accordingly, we conclude that the State’s suppression of the withheld evidence
violated petitioner’s constitutional right to due process under Brady.

Id. at 514. In 2009, all charges against Beaman were dismissed, and he was released after
serving thirteen years in prison. Center on Wrongful Convictions, Alan W. Beaman, UNIV. OF
MICH. LAW SCH., NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Sept. 25, 2014),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3018. In 2015
the Governor granted Beaman’s petition for executive clemency. Id.
41
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2d ed.), Westlaw (database
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editions of the book, which were published fifteen years apart,42 Gershman
noted that prosecutorial misconduct was an increasing problem.43 Gershman,
a former prosecutor with the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, has
authored numerous articles as well as two editions of Professional
Misconduct on prosecutorial and judicial ethics.44 He attributed the growing
misconduct problem to prosecutors’ growing powers, and to courts’ failure
to discipline prosecutors for professional wrongdoing.45
The costs of prosecutorial misconduct—to the wrongfully convicted
defendants, to the victims, and to taxpayers—are high. A Chicago Tribune
study of 11,000 criminal cases between 1963 and 1999 uncovered 381
homicide convictions that were vacated because prosecutors hid exculpatory
evidence or allowed witnesses to lie.46
Prosecutorial misconduct appears to often go unpunished even after it is
identified. A survey of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in more than 11,000
updated Sept. 2015). Professor Gershman has devoted 600 pages to reported instances of
prosecutorial misconduct. Id. The book identifies a range of prosecutorial misconduct, from
wrongdoing in the investigation, to failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, to misusing the
media, to misconduct in sentencing. Id. §§ 1:1–1:52, 5:1–5:25, 6:1–6:37, 13:1–13:19.
42
Id. at Preface to Second Edition.
43
Id. In the first edition of Prosecutorial Misconduct, Professor Gershman summarized
the state of affairs in three short sentences: “Restraints on prosecutorial misconduct are either
meaningless or nonexistent. Relatively few judicial or constitutional sanctions exist to penalize
or deter misconduct; the available sanctions are sparingly used and even when used have not
proved effective. Misconduct is commonly met with judicial passivity and bar association
hypocrisy.” BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT ix (1st ed. 1985).
44
Bennett L. Gershman, PACE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.pace.edu/
faculty/bennett-l-gershman (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).
45
GERSHMAN, supra note 41, at Preface to Second Edition (“The prosecutor’s dominance
in American criminal law, well established when the book was first published in 1985, has
become even more entrenched. The last fifteen years are most notable for a vast accretion of
power by prosecutors, increased deference by courts to prosecutorial prerogatives, and a
general failure of courts and disciplinary bodies to impose meaningful sanctions on
prosecutors for misconduct.”).
46
Armstrong & Possley, supra note 2. In January 1999, the Chicago Tribune published a
series of articles by reporters Ken Armstrong and Maurice Possley (co-author of this article),
titled Trial and Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win. Id. The authors noted:
The appellate courts denounced the prosecutors’ actions with words like ‘unforgivable,’
‘intolerable,’ ‘beyond reprehension,’ and ‘illegal, improper and dishonest.’ At least a dozen of the
prosecutors were investigated by state agencies charged with policing lawyers for misconduct. . .
. One was fired, but appealed and was reinstated with back pay. Another received an in-house
suspension of 30 days. A third prosecutor’s law license was suspended for 59 days, but because of
other misconduct in the case. Not one received any kind of public sanction from a state lawyer
disciplinary agency.

Id.
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criminal proceedings found 2,000 cases where the appellate courts reduced
sentences, dismissed charges, or vacated convictions.47 But the courts
disciplined prosecutors only forty-four times in the cases reviewed.48 A 2010
USA Today study of Department of Justice (“DOJ”) criminal prosecutions
found 201 cases where federal prosecutors acted improperly, but in a review
of bar records could only locate a single instance where a federal prosecutor
was disbarred in the last twelve years.49 And prosecutors are disciplined less
frequently than private attorneys.50

47
CPI, supra note 13, at i–ii, 73–100. The survey was conducted by CPI, a national
organization devoted to investigating and reporting on a wide array of important national
issues. Id. The study involved national investigations of local prosecutors’ conduct in all types
of criminal proceedings. Id. A team of twenty one researchers, writers, and editors analyzed
11,452 state appellate court opinions, trial court rulings, state bar disciplinary filings, and other
sources back to 1970, in which allegations were made of prosecutorial misconduct in criminal
cases. Id. The results revealed that individual judges and appellate court panels cited
prosecutorial misconduct as a factor when dismissing charges, reversing convictions, or
reducing sentences in more than 2,000 cases. Id. In over 500 other cases, judges stated that
prosecutorial misconduct was serious enough to merit additional discussion or, in dissent,
reversal. In many others, judges labeled prosecutorial behavior inappropriate, but upheld
convictions using the harmless error doctrine. Id. The authors located only thirty four cases in
which discipline was imposed on the errant prosecutors. Id.; see also CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR
INTEGRITY, AN EPIDEMIC OF PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT 8 (2013), http://www.prosecutor
integrity.org/wp-content/uploads/EpidemicofProsecutorMisconduct.pdf (making similar
findings of a lack of discipline for misconduct despite a high number of instances).
48
CPI, supra note 13, at 79–80.
49
Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors’ Conduct Can Tip Justice Scales, USA
TODAY (Sept. 23, 2010, 1:31 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/
2010-09-22-federal-prosecutors-reform_N.htm; see also Harry Mitchell Caldwell, Everybody
Talks About Prosecutorial Conduct But Nobody Does Anything About It: A 25-Year Survey of
Prosecutorial Misconduct and a Viable Solution (Pepperdine Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2761252.
50 Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721,
755 (2001). Professor Zacharias conducted a study of “all reported cases in which prosecutors
have been disciplined for violations of professional rules by courts or state disciplinary
authorities.” Id. at 744. His analysis of the kinds of violations of the rules of professional
conduct that are applicable to all attorneys, as well as those specifically applicable to
prosecutors, revealed that “on the whole . . . prosecutors are disciplined rarely, both in the
abstract and relative to private lawyers. . . . [T]he discrepancy between discipline of
prosecutors and private attorneys is enormous.” Id. at 755. A reporter for the San Jose Mercury
News analyzed 1,464 cases summarized in the Bar Journal of California State Bar from 2001
to 2005, of the most serious categories of discipline—disbarment, probation, and suspension.
See Mike Zapler, State Bar Ignores Errant Lawyers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 12, 2006,
5:31 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/taintedtrials/ci_5136869. Of the seventy-five
criminal cases found, only one involved a prosecutor, while seventy-four involved defense
lawyers. Id. Additionally, Professor Alschuler wrote:

5. SULLIVAN FINAL TO PRINTER

11/29/2016 6:53 PM

2015] DISCIPLINING PROSECUTORS—REFORM PROPOSALS

893

The entities charged with disciplining prosecutors for misconduct are
poorly equipped to do so. Even though all states have adopted disciplinary
rules that forbid prosecutors from suppressing exculpatory evidence or
falsifying evidence, prosecutors who engage in this proscribed behavior are
sanctioned infrequently—if at all.51 Bar associations discipline attorneys for
misusing or abusing client funds but are not equipped to, or do not, review
prosecutors’ work.52 The DOJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility
(“OPR” or “Office”), tasked with overseeing federal prosecutors and other
agents, began investigations in only 9 percent of the 4,000 complaints filed
against officials in the last twenty years. Only 4 percent of those were
determined to have merit, and the Office provided little disclosure about what
punishments it applied.53

In preparing this article [examining courtroom misconduct of prosecutors and judges], I surveyed
the reported decisions for the past twenty-five years. Although I uncovered a large number of cases
in which defense attorneys had been punished for contemptuous courtroom behavior, I did not find
a single case in which a prosecutor had been so disciplined.

Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L.
REV. 629, 674 (1972).
51
Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors For Brady Violations:
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987). Professor Rosen conducted an exhaustive
search of sources, including every state’s disciplinary body. Id. He concluded: “[D]espite the
universal adoption by the states of Disciplinary Rules prohibiting prosecutorial suppression of
exculpatory evidence and falsification of evidence, and despite numerous reported cases
showing violations of these rules, disciplinary charges have been brought infrequently and
meaningful sanctions rarely applied.” Id. “A prosecutor who suppresses evidence, falsifies
evidence, or permits a witness to commit perjury too often remains unpunished.” Id. at 742.
52
JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 181 (2000). The authors, with others of the New
York City-based Innocence Project, reconstructed sixty-two cases in which convicted
defendants had been exonerated, often after lengthy prison sentences, with some facing the
death penalty. Id. at 263–64. They found prosecutorial misconduct involved in many cases,
including suppression of favorable evidence, knowing use of false testimony, and coerced
witnesses. Id. at 265. The authors noted the irony in the way states’ disciplinary systems
functioned:
Nearly all disciplinary action by bar associations arises from abuse of client funds— typically
money that was given to an attorney to be held in escrow for a home purchase. In circumstances
where life and liberty are at stake, though, most state bar associations are ill-equipped to review
the ethical behavior of prosecutors, and they almost never do so.

Id. at 181.
53
See William Moushey, Win at All Costs, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1998, at A1. In
a series of articles published between November 22 and December 13, 1998, reporter William
Moushey reported on his examination of over 1,500 cases in which federal agents and
prosecutors were accused of engaging in misconduct in order to obtain convictions:
This [Office of Professional Responsibility] within the Justice Department is supposed to oversee
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The lack of discipline imposed on prosecutors who violate the code of
professional ethics has been widely observed in legal literature.54 But despite
this well-known problem, the landscape has not shifted.55 Courts and ethics
bodies rarely sanction prosecutors, and the rare disciplinary measures tend to
be mere slaps on the wrist.56 This trend of inaction is consistent even in

the conduct of federal agents and prosecutors, but little oversight is happening. The office opened
official investigations into only 9 percent of the 4,000 complaints filed against federal law
enforcement officials during the past 20 years. The office found that only 4 percent of those
complaints had merit. Since the office only discloses specifics of its investigations on rare
occasions, it is not clear what punishment was meted out.

Id. at A-12.
54
See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 50, at 673 (“The legal profession has long contended
that its lofty ideals are effectuated through a process of rigorous self-policing, but at least in
the area of prosecutorial misconduct, its pretentions have been totally unfounded.”); Bruce A.
Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little
Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 72 (1995) (“[T]he process for sanctioning wrongful
conduct of federal prosecutors is structurally inadequate.”). “The public record suggests,
however, that federal prosecutors are rarely, if ever, referred to federal grievance committees.”
Id. at 83. “Without a doubt, the dearth of reported disciplinary proceedings brought by state
authorities against federal prosecutors reflects that not only are they rarely reported, but such
proceedings are also rarely initiated.” Id. at 89. “There are certainly enough authorities—
federal and state, external and internal—overseeing federal prosecutors. Yet, commentators
have uniformly lamented the lack of effective discipline of prosecutors who violate standards
of professional conduct.” Id. at 94. See also Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and
Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 979 (1984) (“Prosecutors’ unethical trial conduct is
too common and too destructive to ignore. . . . Frequent misconduct by prosecutors is
subversive to the perception that the American legal profession is capable of self-policing
professional standards.”). “For too long we have ignored a self-evident fact—unethical
conduct by prosecutors at trial is seldom dealt with by the grievance process.” Id. at 988.
55
Michael L. Perlin, “Power and Greed and the Corruptible Seed”: Mental Disability,
Prosecutorial Misconduct, and the Death Penalty 9–10 (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors) (“There is little incentive for prosecutors to reform their ways. There is often
absolutely no accountability. . . . Even if the misconduct is noticed, the defendant’s conviction
is still likely to stand. And there is no stigma to the miscreant prosecutor since s/he is virtually
never mentioned in any subsequent appellate opinion. . . . Although scholars have written
frequently and persuasively about ethical breaches in such cases (and the need to monitor such
breaches), their words are generally met with overwhelming indifference.” (endnotes
omitted)). “In short, prosecutors have virtually carte blanche authority to misinform jurors, to
play to irrational fears, and to employ unscrupulous experts. And there are virtually no voices
raised in opposition.” Id. at 15.
56
See CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, supra note 47, at 8 (“So what happens when
ethical codes are violated? Nine studies have analyzed the professional consequences of
prosecutor misconduct. . . . Of the 3,625 instances of misconduct identified, these studies
reveal that public sanctions are imposed in only 63 cases -- less than 2% of the time[]. Often,
these sanctions represented only a proverbial ‘slap-of-the-wrist.’ . . . Even in the most
reprehensible cases, judges typically do not refer the case for disciplinary action and ethics
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arguably the most egregious cases of prosecutorial misconduct: the
suppression of exculpatory evidence.57 Alleged misconduct or breaches of
ethical codes are infrequently reported due to ineffective (or a complete lack
of) policies and means to gather the information in both state and federal
courts.58
In sum, “professional responsibility measures [are] almost always
ineffective in the prosecutorial misconduct context.”59 As a result, sanctions
and disciplinary measures have been no real threat to prosecutors.60
boards fail to apply sanctions. Courts rely upon fault-absolving notions like ‘harmless error,’
a doctrine that has been termed the ‘lie that the criminal justice system tells itself.’”).
57
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline
Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 288 (2004) (“The most common, and in any event the
most dangerous misconduct is the intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence. Despite
this well documented and all too recurrent violation of professional responsibility, prosecutors
who engage in such tactics are rarely, if ever, disciplined.”).
58
See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 276–77 (2007) (“Even when it [prosecutorial abuse or
misconduct] is discovered, the legal remedies are ineffective. . . . [R]eferrals of prosecutors
rarely occur. Even when referrals occur, state bar authorities seldom hold prosecutors
accountable for misconduct.”). “[T]he state disciplinary process has proven woefully
inadequate in holding prosecutors accountable for misconduct.” Id. at 282. “Until the rules
and the disciplinary process are reformed, prosecutors will continue to engage in misconduct
without consequences.” Id. at 310. See also Michael S. McGinniss, Sending the Message:
Using Technology to Support Judicial Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to State Disciplinary
Agencies, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 37 (2013) (“Despite the strong public interest in effectively
regulating lawyers, neither state nor federal courts have developed adequate policies and
practices to ensure that lawyers’ misconduct during litigation proceedings is consistently
reported to state disciplinary agencies.”). “State and federal courts have generally failed to
adopt rules, or even informal but reliable policies and practices, to ensure that lawyers’ ethical
violations are consistently reported to disciplinary agencies in the lawyers’ jurisdictions of
licensure.” Id. at 59.
59
David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v.
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 213 (2011). “[P]rofessional
responsibility measures as they are currently composed do a poor job of policing prosecutorial
misconduct.” Id. at 203. “[P]rosecutors have rarely been subjected to disciplinary action by
state bar authorities.” Id. at 205.
60
See Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the
Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 902
(1997) (“If the prosecutor’s duty to make the disclosures required by Brady is to be honored,
it is not fear of disciplinary proceedings before the bar association that will bring this about.”).
“Brady recognizes a right fundamental to a fair trial. It is simply ignored by all too many
prosecutors whenever its observance appears to threaten the prospect of a conviction.” Id. at
933. For more examples of a lack of discipline against prosecutors, see BRANDON L. GARRETT,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 168 (2011);
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 2, at 16; Brian P. Barrow, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: Tradition
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II. ALL JUDGES AND LAWYERS—INCLUDING THEIR LAWYER CLERKS—
HAVE PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO REPORT SERIOUS PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT TO DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES
As shown above, during the past forty years virtually none of the
reported cases of prosecutors’ violations of the rules of professional
conduct—regardless of the subject, severity, and extent of the violation—
have been reported to disciplinary authorities. This is a problem that cries out
for a cure, which ought to be initiated by those involved on a daily basis in
the state and federal criminal justice systems—trial and reviewing court
judges and their lawyer clerks, as well as prosecutors and defense lawyers,
and the organizations that represent them. The continued failure to report
prosecutorial misconduct raises questions about the fairness of our systems
and our ability as a profession to discipline itself. In addition, the nonPays a Price for the Reduction of Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 301, 327
(1995); Elizabeth N. Dewar, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450,
1456 (2006); Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of Prosecutorial
Courtroom Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start Prosecuting The Prosecutors?, 19 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 39, 40 (1987); Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games
Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 565 (2007) [hereinafter Gershman I]; Bennett
L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 722 (2006)
[hereinafter Gershman II]; Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys
to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1062–63 (2009); Peter J.
Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 829
(1999); Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 521 (2011); Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 565 (1987); Peter A. Joy, The
Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping
Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403, 427–28 (2006); Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier et al., Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases, 55 WAYNE L.
REV. 1327, 1337–38 (2009); Kozinski, supra note 5, at viii, xxii–xxvii, xxxi–xxxiii, xxxix–
xlii; McGinniss, supra note 58, at 59; Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant
Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies That Prove
That Assumption is Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 572 (2011); Richard G. Singer, Forensic
Misconduct by Federal Prosecutors—and How It Grew, 20 ALA. L. REV. 227 passim (1968);
Christopher Slobogin, The Death Penalty in Florida, 1 ELON L. REV. 17, 33 (2009); Lesley E.
Williams, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441, 3472 (1999); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson,
25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 913, 919–21 (2012); Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s
Misbehaving Prosecutors, and the System that Protects Them, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5,
2013, 11:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/prosecutorial-misconductnew-orleans-louisiana_n_3529891.html (“Prosecutors are relied upon to police themselves,
and it isn't working.”); Bennett L. Gershman, How to Hold Bad Prosecutors Accountable: The
Case for a Commission on Prosecutorial Misconduct, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 31, 2015),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/31/how-to-hold-bad-prosecutorsaccountable-the-case-for-a-commission-on-prosecutorial-conduct.html.
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reporting of known breaches of other lawyers’ ethical responsibilities, if
serious and therefore reportable, has the potential of involving the nonreporters in separate professional violations.
A. RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL STATE COURT JUDGES, ALL STATE
AND FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, AND ALL LAW CLERKS

The following discussion is based upon the American Bar Association’s
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereafter “Rules” or “Professional
Rules”), and Model Code of Judicial Conduct (hereafter “Judicial Code” or
“Code”). With variations as explained in the Appendix, the Professional
Rules have been adopted by all states except California, and the Judicial Code
by twenty-nine states.
The Rules and Code contain well thought-out principles and
commentary and guidelines for the conduct of judges and lawyers, including
those employed as state and federal prosecutors and state court judges.61 Here
are the applicable provisions:
• Professional Rules.62 Rule 8.3(a) of the Professional Rules, entitled
“Reporting Professional Misconduct,” provides: “A lawyer who knows that
another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty,

61

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 170
(1970) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (“‘A judge should utilize his opportunities to criticize and
correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and counselors, brought to his attention; and, if
adverse comment is not a sufficient corrective, should send the matter at once to the proper
investigating and disciplinary authorities.’”) (quoting CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS [AND]
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 11 (1937)).
62
Although it has not been definitively determined whether state court judges as lawyers
are bound by the Professional Rules in addition to the Judicial Code, in this article we assume
state court judges are not subject to the Rules, because the Code is directed solely to judges,
while the Rules are directed solely to non-judicial lawyers. Law clerks in federal prosecutor
offices are bound by the rules of professional conduct in the states where they are licensed. 28
U.S.C. § 530B (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(a) (2014). Law clerks for federal judges are also bound
by the rules applicable to judicial employees. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES,
GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, Vol. 2, Pt. A §§ 310.10(a), 310.30, 320 (2013),
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/vol02a-ch03pdf. Judicial clerks are also subject to applicable
rules of professional conduct in the states in which they are licensed. See id. at § 320. Law
clerks in federal prosecutor offices are bound by the United States Attorneys’ Manual, which
contains reporting requirements that mirror those of federal prosecutors. UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-4.100 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-1-4000standards-conduct#1-4.100 [hereinafter USAM].
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trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the
appropriate professional authority.”63
• Judicial Code. Rule 2.15 (B) and (D) of the Judicial Code provide:
(B) A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall
inform the appropriate authority. . . . (D) A judge who receives information
indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct shall take appropriate action.64

Both the Judicial Code and Professional Rules define “knowledge” and
“knows” as “actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge
may be inferred from circumstances.”65 Rule 1.0(l) of the Professional Rules
provides, “‘Substantial’ when used in reference to a degree or extent denotes
a material matter of clear and weighty importance.”66
B. RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL FEDERAL JUDGES AND THEIR LAW
CLERKS

Federal judges are bound by the Code of Judicial Conduct for United
States Judges, which has been adopted by the Judicial Conference of the
United States pursuant to its statutory authority.67 These rules apply to federal
circuit and district court judges, magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges, and
the Federal Court of Claims. Canon 3(B)(5) of the code provides: “A judge
should take appropriate action upon learning of reliable evidence indicating
the likelihood that a judge’s conduct contravened this Code or a lawyer
violated applicable rules of professional conduct.”68 The Commentary to this
rule provides in relevant part:
Appropriate action may include direct communication with the judge or lawyer, other
direct action if available, reporting the conduct to the appropriate authorities . . . .
Appropriate action may also include responding to a subpoena to testify or otherwise

63

PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 8.3(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, r. 2.15(B) and (C) (2010) [hereinafter
CODE or JUDICIAL CODE] (emphasis added).
65
RULES r. 1.0(f); CODE, Terminology.
66
RULES r. 1.0(l).
67
28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (“The Conference may also prescribe and modify rules for the
exercise of the authority provided in chapter 16 of this title [Complaints Against Judges and
Judicial Discipline]”).
68
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(B)(5) (2014).
64
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participating in judicial or lawyer disciplinary proceedings; a judge should be candid
and honest with disciplinary authorities.69

A federal statute provides that all federal attorneys are subject to the
same state laws and rules, as well as local federal court rules, that govern
attorneys in the state where the attorney practices.70 They are also required to
comply with the reporting requirements of the United States Attorneys’
Manual.71 Section 1-4.100 of the Manual provides: “Evidence and nonfrivolous allegations of serious misconduct by Department attorneys that
relate to the exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate, or provide legal
advice shall be reported to OPR.”72
C. THE KINDS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT THAT SHOULD BE
REPORTED

Prosecutorial misconduct ordinarily comes into play in connection with
the processing of criminal cases. For example, a prosecutor may violate the
ethical norms of his practice when coordinating with police and agents who
are questioning potential witnesses, examining crime scenes, identifying
suspects, collecting items of evidence, conducting grand jury hearings,
preparing indictments, dealing with defense lawyers handling pretrial motion
practice, providing “discovery” of evidence to the defense, negotiating guilty
pleas, preparing for and participating in bench and jury trials, conducting jury
selection, making opening statements, introducing prosecution evidence and
witnesses, cross examining defense witnesses, drafting jury instructions, and
making closing arguments. Every step of this process presents the potential
for misconduct by prosecutors.
In applying the general rules set out above, it is necessary to determine
what conduct falls within the ambit of the reporting requirements in both the
Rules and Code, namely, “a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects . . . .” 73 The United
States Attorneys’ Manual uses the word “serious” to trigger reporting to the

69

Id. at Canon 3(B)(5) cmt.
28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2012). Other statutes include the Jencks Act, which relates to a
federal prosecutor’s duty to produce prior statements made by government witnesses. 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (2012). Prosecutors are also subject to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
11 (pleas of guilty) and 16 (discovery obligations). FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, 16.
71
USAM §§ 1-4.100, 1-4.120.
72
Id. § 1-4.100(B) (emphasis added).
73
PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 8.3(a); JUDICIAL CODE Cannon 2, Rule 2.15(B).
70
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OPR.74 These provisions are phrased in conclusory terms and do not specify
with precision the kinds of conduct that trigger the reporting. However, some
guidance is contained in the comments to the Professional Rules:75
If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the failure to report any
violation would itself be a professional offense. Such a requirement existed in many
jurisdictions but proved unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to
those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A
measure of judgment is, therefore, required in complying with the provisions of this
Rule. The term “substantial” refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not
the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware.

The Terminology section of the Professional Rules states: “‘Substantial’
when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear
and weighty importance.”76 Comment 1 to Code Rule 2.15 states in part:
“This Rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that an
independent judiciary must vigorously endeavor to prevent.”77 Even with
these additional provisions, the lines of demarcation as to reportable conduct
are imprecise—bright lines are missing—hence the facts and good judgment
govern application of the rules.78
In this article we will use the word “serious” to describe reportable
conduct, although we recognize that this is itself a flexible concept subject to
interpretation. Seriousness may be measured by the degree of a major
74

USAM § 1-4.100(B).
PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 8.3(a) cmt. 3 (emphasis added); see also id. at cmt. 1 (“Selfregulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary
investigation [sic] when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. An
apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary
investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is
unlikely to discover the offense.”). See also Sup. Ct. Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances &
Discipline, Advisory Op. 2016-2 (“A lawyer has a duty to report unprivileged knowledge of
another lawyer's misconduct under [RULE 8.3].”).
76
PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 1.0(l).
77
JUDICIAL CODE Canon 2, Rule 2.15 cmt. 1; see also STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
SANCTIONS § III.C.6.11 (1992), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/corrected_standards_sanctions_may2012_wfootnotes.authcheckd
am.pdf (“Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with intent to deceive the court,
makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly withholds material
information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant
or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.”); id. § III.C.6.12 (noting that
suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of the same circumstances and takes
no remedial action).
78
See Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge’s Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other
Judges and Lawyers and its Effect on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 769–
71 (1997).
75
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individual deviation from accepted professional norms or by the cumulative
effect of a series of violations or unfair dealings with defense counsel or the
courts. Triggering events do not involve honest mistakes or good faith errors
of judgment, because those do not call into question the prosecutor’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness to be a member of the legal profession, which is
necessary to triggering the rule’s reporting requirement.
It is important to bear in mind that the duties imposed on lawyers to
report serious misconduct to disciplinary authorities are more expansive than
the test for reversible or harmless error. An example of this distinction may
be illustrated by the prosecutor’s duty pursuant to the Due Process Clause to
make pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the defense, as required
by Brady v. Maryland79 and its progeny, compared to the duties on the same
subject imposed by the Professional Rules80 and similar codes adopted by
states. As we observe in Part III.C.1, infra, in most of the reported cases in
which defendants argued on appeal for reversals and new trials because the
prosecution failed to disclose favorable evidence as required by Brady,
reviewing courts have held that the failure to produce did not affect the
outcome of the case and was therefore harmless error. Nevertheless, the
prosecution’s failure to produce may be reportable to disciplinary authorities,
pursuant to applicable rules of professional conduct. These reports do not
focus on whether the conduct is considered grounds for reversal, but rather
on the seriousness of the prosecutor’s conduct without regard to the outcome
of the case. The American Bar Association has issued a Formal Opinion
directed specifically to this point:
Unlike Model Rules that expressly incorporate a legal standard, Rule 3.8(d) establishes
an independent one. Courts as well as commentators have recognized that the ethical
obligation is more demanding than the constitutional obligation. The ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice likewise acknowledge that prosecutors’ ethical duty of disclosure
extends beyond the constitutional obligation. In particular Rule 3.8(d) is more
demanding than the constitutional case law, in that it requires the disclosure of evidence
or information favorable to the defense without regard to the anticipated impact of the
evidence or information on a trial’s outcome. The rule thereby requires prosecutors to
steer clear of the constitutional line, erring on the side of caution.81

79

373 U.S. 83 (1963). References in this article to “Brady” include its progeny.
PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 3.8 (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . (d) make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense[.]”).
81
ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/2015/May/
Conference/Materials/aba_formal_opnion_09_454.pdf; see also discussion in Part III.B.1,
infra.
80
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This same distinction is drawn in case law and the United States Attorneys’
Manual, as explained in greater detail in Part III.B.1 below.
D. THE FAILURE TO REPORT A LAWYER’S SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IS
ITSELF A VIOLATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL RULES AND THE
JUDICIAL CODE

The findings cited in Part I and the many published appellate court
opinions describing prosecutorial misconduct establish beyond reasonable
doubt that during the past several decades countless instances of prosecutorial
misconduct were not reported to disciplinary authorities. It is reasonable to
assume that many cases involved misconduct that reached the level of
“seriousness” that triggered an obligation on the part of the lawyers and
judges who were aware of the misconduct to report promptly to disciplinary
bodies. In each case, the failure of the lawyer or judge with knowledge to
report was a separate violation of the rules.
The National Prosecution Standards, adopted by the National District
Attorneys Association (NDAA), a national organization of state prosecutors,
explicitly recognize the risk to prosecutors for not reporting known violations
by fellow prosecutors of the rules described above.82 The Duty to Report
Misconduct provides: “A prosecutor’s failure to report known misconduct
may itself constitute a violation of the prosecutor’s professional duties.”83
Several state supreme courts have enforced this obligation by imposing
discipline on non-reporting lawyers. In In re Himmel,84 Illinois lawyer James
Himmel became aware that his client’s former lawyer, Casey, had embezzled
funds that were owed to the client.85 The client was worried that any action
against Casey would delay her recovery of the missing funds. Himmel
therefore prepared a settlement agreement with Casey and agreed not to
report him to the Illinois disciplinary authority; in exchange, the client agreed
to share the proceeds of any recovery with Himmel.86 The Supreme Court of
Illinois suspended Himmel for one year for his action, saying: “This failure
to report resulted in interference with the Commission’s investigation of
82

NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.6(d) (3d
ed. 2009), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20
Commentary.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS].
83
Id.
84
533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).
85
Id. at 791.
86
Id. at 792. The report must be made to the Illinois Attorney and Registration
Disciplinary Commission; reporting to the trial court does not discharge the duty to report.
Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 730 N.E.2d 4, 15 (Ill. 2000).
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Casey, and thus with the administration of justice . . . . We are particularly
disturbed by the fact that respondent drafted a settlement agreement with
Casey rather than report his misconduct.”87
A similar conclusion was reached in In re Riehlmann,88 which involved
Louisiana lawyer Michael Riehlmann, who was told by former prosecutor
Gary Deegan that when Deegan was prosecuting a murder case, he
intentionally withheld from the defense lawyer a crime lab report that
exculpated the defendant, who was convicted and sentenced to death.89
Riehlmann eventually told the defense lawyers and the current prosecutor
what Deegan said, but he did not inform the Louisiana Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (ODC) until after Deegan’s death five years later, when Riehlmann
learned the defendant was about to be executed.90 The Louisiana Supreme
Court observed that the case presented it “for the first time with an
opportunity to delineate the scope of an attorney’s duty under rule 8.3 to
report the professional misconduct of a fellow member of the bar.”91 The
court found that Riehlmann’s earlier report to the defense lawyers and the
District Attorney did not fulfill his reporting obligation: “Respondent’s
knowledge of Mr. Deegan’s conduct was sufficient to impose on him an
obligation to promptly report Mr. Deegan to the ODC. Having failed in that
obligation, respondent is himself subject to punishment.”92
87

Id. at 795–96. Commenting on the rule of the Himmel case, an Illinois lawyer wrote:
“Lawyers may report any ethical violation to an appropriate disciplinary authority but they
must report only those violations that relate to a lawyer’s honesty and fitness to practice law.”
Kenneth R. Landis, You May Be Your Brother’s Keeper: When Must You Report Another
Lawyer’s Misconduct To a Disciplinary Authority? 5 (undated) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (emphasis in original).
88
891 So. 2d 1239 (La. 2003).
89
Id. at 1241.
90
Id. at 1242.
91
Id. at 1246.
92
Id. at 1249; see also In re Bruno, 956 So. 2d 577, 579, 582–83 (La. 2007) (suspending
Bruno from practicing law in part for failing to make timely disclosure of a false statement
made by his co-counsel to a federal district court judge); In re Tolchinsky, 740 So. 2d 109,
110–11 (La. 1999) (disbarring Tolchinsky for, inter alia, not reporting the improper conduct
of his employee, a disbarred lawyer); Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice Litigation and
the Duty to Report Misconduct, 1 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 40, 46–47
(2011) (“With notable examples to the contrary, lawyers are rarely sanctioned for [failure to
report infractions].”); Diane S. Ciolino, Rule 8.3. Reporting Professional Misconduct:
Annotations, LOUISIANA LEGAL ETHICS, http://lalegalethics.org/louisiana-rules-ofprofessional-conduct/article-8-maintaining-the-integrity-of-the-profession/rule-8-3-reporting
-professional-misconduct/#fnref-360-3 (last updated Feb. 28, 2015) (detailing other instances
of attorney discipline in Louisiana for failure to report violations). But see D.C. Bar Ass’n,
Formal Ethics Op. 246: A Lawyer’s Obligation to Report Another Lawyer’s Misconduct,
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The Supreme Court of South Dakota observed that the same potential
for violation of the rules applies to members of the judiciary:
Among the administrative responsibilities imposed on a judge in Canon 3, therefore, is
that of taking or initiating appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer
for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware. Thus, a judge
exposes himself or herself to the disciplinary action for failure to report the misconduct
of other judges or attorneys to attorney disciplinary bodies and judicial conduct
commissions.93

With these rules in mind, we turn to recommendations for the various
persons and organizations involved in the criminal judicial process.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMS IN CRIMINAL CASES
We submit the following proposals in the hope that the incidence of
misconduct in criminal cases will decline and that the few prosecutors who
violate their ethical obligations and blot the profession’s reputation will
receive appropriate discipline. While this article is directed primarily at
prosecutorial misconduct, many of the comments and recommendations
apply equally to defense lawyers.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO TRIAL COURT JUDGES IN
CRIMINAL CASES

1. Trial court judges should comply with their obligations to report serious
lawyer misconduct to disciplinary authorities.
Trial judges, both state and federal, are on the front line when it comes
to observing the conduct of the lawyers who appear before them. They
oversee pretrial discovery including Brady motions, and deal with the trial
lawyers about witness and evidentiary issues. They handle guilty pleas. They
conduct bench trials, referee jury trials, and rule on evidentiary issues and the
objections that inevitably occur during trials. They impose sentences and
wrestle with all the other myriad matters in the criminal system.94 Over time,

https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion246.cfm (Oct. 18, 1994)
(holding no duty to report another lawyer’s violation when the knowledge stems from a
malpractice suit a client wishes to file against the other lawyer).
93
In re Discipline of Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41, 63–64 (S.D. 2003).
94
For examples of potential prosecutorial misconduct, see Alschuler, supra note 50, at
674; Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 410–17 (2001); Gershman II, supra note 60, at 688; Joy, supra
note 60, at 402–03; Michael Ghetti & Paul Killebrew, With Impunity: The Lack Of
Accountability Of A Criminal Prosecutor, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 349, 358–60 (2012); Green,
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trial judges get to know many of the prosecutors and defense lawyers who
practice before them and learn which ones are inclined to push or cross the
limits of acceptable behavior. Judge D. Brooks Smith of the Third Circuit
stated: “The trial court is where issues of prosecutorial misconduct really play
out. . . . District courts are in a better position [than are appellate courts] to
ensure that a prosecutor properly fulfills the duties and obligations of his
office.”95 This obligation is consistent with the court’s obligation to supervise
professional ethics:
In reporting disciplinary violations by lawyers, judges would be enforcing the rules for
which they themselves are responsible. By and large, courts have been jealous of their
power to regulate the conduct of lawyers in this country and have been unwilling to
cede this responsibility to legislatures or to administrative bodies. Courts should not be
able to have it both ways. If they are going to maintain responsibility for rules of
conduct and their enforcement, then they should be taking the lead in enforcement with
respect to violations that occur in front of them . . . . They should forward matters for
investigation when there is an apparent violation even if they are not certain and do not
have the time or the resources to make a crucial finding of fact.96

Personal relationships may make it difficult and distasteful to report to
disciplinary authorities,97 but the serious policy concerns implicated by
prosecutorial misconduct require action: “Indeed, the silent judge may have
integrity, but consider the price of the judge’s silence: the unreported
offensive conduct will continue to infest the legal system. Judges should
demonstrate the responsibility to take action and thereby protect the court
system they serve.”98

supra note 54, at 80–81 n.65; Keenan, supra note 59, at 203–04; Rosen, supra note 51, at 734–
35; Steele, supra note 54, at 970–75; Weeks, supra note 60, at 883–96; Zacharias, supra note
50, at 724; Note, The Natures and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution
of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946, 980 n.165 (1954) [hereinafter Columbia Note].
95
D. Brooks Smith, Policing Prosecutors: What Role Can Appellate Courts Play?, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 835–36 (2010) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1303
(11th Cir. 1998)); see also McGinniss, supra note 58, at 54–55; Judith A. McMorrow et al.,
Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported
Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1436–37, 1462–64, 1471–72 (2004).
96
Andrew L. Kaufman, Judicial Ethics: The Less-Often Asked Questions, 64 WASH. L.
REV. 851, 862 (1989).
97
Trial court judges in criminal courts are often appointed directly from or after serving
as prosecutors or defense lawyers, and therefore are dealing with friends, former colleagues,
and adversaries, resulting in understandable reluctance to instigate disciplinary action. See
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win.
Part 5: Break Rules Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 14, 1999), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/watchdog/chi-020103trial5-story.html.
98
Abramson, supra note 78, at 780.
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The materials contained in Part I show that most trial court judges and
lawyer members of their staffs have remained silent.99 Although attention is
usually focused on the wrongdoing of prosecutors, trial judges share a portion
of the blame when trials are not conducted fairly. Written over thirty years
ago, this remains true today:
Although the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of our profession’s ethical
standards is but one scene, it affects the entire play. The judge’s ethical code says that
judges should be active, but that mandate is ignored. This sets the stage for the
hypocrisy of the entire production. If self-regulation is to be viable and believable, both
to the public and to the players themselves, there must be some minimum level of
honesty and commitment.100

To a practicing lawyer, the threat of personal discipline, whether before
a court or separate disciplinary authority, is serious business. The accused
prosecutor is no longer the aggressor, but rather is on the defensive, in an
unfamiliar, career-threatening proceeding. He must justify his conduct
without an immunity shield. The potential consequences are severe—public
sanction, suspension, disbarment, and/or loss of license and employment. If
the disciplinary system operates promptly and fairly, it will provide a far
greater deterrent than reversal of a conviction with the expense of retrial paid
for by others.101 The example set by disciplinary proceedings also carries a
powerful ripple effect, a shot across the bow to others who may be tempted
to stray from a righteous path.
Accordingly, when attorney misconduct is brought to the attention of a
trial judge or a judge’s legal staff member, he has an ethical duty to consider
whether the matter requires that he inform the appropriate disciplinary
authority or take other action.102 If trial judges comply with the mandatory
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, they will help get rid of errant
prosecutors and increase the fairness of the criminal justice system.103
99
See McMorrow et al., supra note 95, at 1435 (“Judges are not a significant source of
reporting misconduct to the bar disciplinary apparatus.”). “[F]ederal courts relatively rarely
rely on the state disciplinary system to regulate attorney misconduct in their courts.” Id. at
1443.
100
John M. Levy, The Judge’s Role in the Enforcement of Ethics—Fear and Learning in
the Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 116 (1982).
101 See Barrow, supra note 60, at 329 (“The key feature of all of these methods of discipline
is that they make the errant prosecutor answerable to a professional body or association that is
vested with the power to discipline, suspend, or even disbar its members. . . . For the benefit
of the criminal justice system, the Court must realign its focus to the application of disciplinary
measures for errant prosecutors[.]”).
102
Abramson, supra note 78, at 759.
103
For examples of trial court judges who have complied with this rule, see United States
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2. When appropriate, trial court judges should use their own powers to
sanction lawyer misconduct.
In addition to reporting prosecutorial misconduct to disciplinary
authorities, state and federal trial court judges have the power to control the
conduct of lawyers who appear before them, and to impose sanctions on those
who misbehave. Some of these powers are inherent, and some are derived
from statutes and court rules. For example, trial judges may hold lawyers in
contempt for unprofessional conduct that occurs in cases before them.104 This
is especially important when the misconduct is not deemed serious enough to
require granting a new trial but the offender should nevertheless be called to
account. A catalogue of potential disciplinary remedies available to trial
courts is contained in an opinion of an Eleventh Circuit panel:
On the matter of professional misconduct of prosecutors, the realities require that we
defer to our colleagues on the district courts to take the lead. . . . The district courts have
many potential remedies available: (1) contempt citations; (2) fines; (3) reprimands; (4)
suspension from the court’s bar; (5) removal or disqualification from office; and (6)
recommendations to bar associations to take disciplinary action.105

v. Bowen, 969 F. Supp. 2d 518, 546 (E.D. La. 2012) (sending copy of order to state
disciplinary board and federal district’s Lawyers Disciplinary Enforcement Committee), aff’d,
No. 13-31078, 2015 WL 4925029 at *19 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015); United States v. Lane, 577
F. Supp. 504, 512 n.16 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (reporting prosecutor misconduct “[i]n light of [the
c]ourt’s duty under . . . Canon 3B(3)”); In re Maurice, 167 B.R. 114, 128 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.,
1994); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics of Iowa State Bar Ass’n. v. Ramey, 512 N.W.2d 569, 571
(Iowa 1994) (commending trial judge for referring lawyer’s conduct to state ethics
committee); In re Bruno, 956 So. 2d 577, 578 (La. 2007) (noting that District Court, sitting en
banc, appointed the U.S. Attorney to investigate Bruno’s conduct); and Denis Slattery, Bronx
Prosecutor Bashed and Barred from Courtroom for Misconduct, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6,
2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/bronx-prosecutor-barred-courtroomarticle-1.1746238.
104
18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a); see also GERSHMAN, supra note 41 §
14:9 (“Although contempt is frequently used to punish defense counsel for misconduct, it is
rarely used to punish prosecutors.”); Alschuler, supra note 50, at 673–74 (“There is no reason
why contempt citations could not be used to control prosecutorial conduct in the same way
that they have been used to control the conduct of defense attorneys and lawyers in civil
cases.”); Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, passim
(1971); Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of Prosecutorial Courtroom
Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start Prosecuting the Prosecutors?, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.
REV. 39, 58–59 (1987); Green, supra note 54, at 80–81: Kirchmeier et al., supra note 60, at
1373; Singer, supra note 60, at 276; Zacharias, supra note 50, at 763–64; Columbia Note,
supra note 94, at 983–84. Contempt may be imposed summarily when the misconduct occurs
in the judge’s presence; otherwise, a hearing must be conducted. See Ex parte Gordon, 584
S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979).
105
United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 1998) (“We thus find
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3. Trial judges should enter pretrial orders that provide for full compliance
with prosecutors’ obligations to produce exculpatory evidence, and that
contain quickly available sanctions for non-compliance.
Trial court judges may help ensure adherence to the rules of professional
conduct by requiring in pretrial discovery orders that prosecutors respond
fully and fairly to discovery requests in accordance with their obligations
under the Constitution and the applicable rules of professional conduct, and
by ensuring that known violations will expose prosecutors summarily to
disciplinary action.
Trial judges have the power to require prosecutors to make pretrial
production of evidence that “tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense,” as required by Model Rule 3.8(d).106 This rule imposes
what may be a distasteful obligation to prosecutors—to provide the defense
with witnesses and evidence that undermine the prosecution’s case—and
hence the temptation to grasp for reasons for non-disclosure may be strong.
The Department of Justice has provided an excellent approach to this subject
in the Memorandum for Department Prosecutors, January 4, 2010, which
provides in part:
Step 3: Making the Disclosures . . . Section 9-5.001 [of the USAM] details the
Department’s policy regarding the disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment
information and provides for broader disclosures than required by Brady and Giglio.
Prosecutors are encouraged to provide discovery broader and more comprehensive
than the discovery obligations.107

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently explained why the
prosecution’s discovery obligations should not be measured by the harmless
error test often used on appeal to determine whether non-production requires
reversal of convictions:
Retrospective analysis, while it necessarily comports with appellate review, is wholly
inapplicable in pretrial prospective determinations . . . . [“T]he due process
underpinning of Brady-Agurs is a command for disclosure [b]efore an accused has to
defend himself . . . .” It is impossible for a trial court at the pretrial stage to require “the

ourselves in a situation with which we are all too familiar: a prosecutor has engaged in
misconduct at trial, but no reversible error has been shown.”). “That we find an error not to be
reversible does not transmute that error into a virtue. The error is still an error.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Eason, 920 F.2d 731, 737 (11th Cir. 1990)).
106
PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 3.8(d).
107
Memorandum for Department Prosecutors from Deputy Att’y Gen. David W. Ogden,
Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.
gov/dag/memorandum-department-prosecutors [hereinafter DOJ Memo] (italicized emphasis
added).
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defendant . . . to satisfy the test of materiality normally associated with a retrospective
Brady-Agurs inquiry, namely, materiality to outcome . . . No one has that gift of
prophecy.” Therefore, “[t]o argue that the court can apply a material-to-outcome test
before trial is to argue a contradiction.”108

B. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO JUDGES WHO SERVE ON
REVIEWING COURTS

1. Judges on reviewing courts should comply with their obligations to
report serious lawyer misconduct to disciplinary authorities.
Reviewing courts in both the state and federal systems set the rules as
well as the tone for lawyer conduct. They have an important but largely
unfulfilled role, indeed a duty, to help prevent the kinds of prosecutorial
misconduct often disclosed in records on appeal. But regardless of the
severity of the misconduct, with few exceptions no reports have been made
to disciplinary bodies.109 In the vast majority of cases, reviewing courts deal
with alleged prosecutorial misconduct by determining whether it occurred,
and if so whether it constituted harmless or harmful error, and issue their
opinions without considering whether the conduct is sufficiently serious to
require reference to disciplinary authorities. When this occurs, the judges do
not fully perform their judicial functions.110 As was written over forty years

108
In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 208 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 408 A.2d
303, 306–07 (D.C. 1979)).
109
For examples of appellate courts in criminal and civil cases reporting lawyer
misconduct to disciplinary authorities, see Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1216 (1st
Cir. 1996); Igo v. Coachmen Indus., 938 F.2d 650, 655, 659 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991); Lewis v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1446, 1459, 1465
(7th Cir. 1987); Lowenschuss v. Bluhdorn, 613 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1980); Asphalt Eng’rs,
Inc. v. Galusha, 770 P.2d 1180, 1184 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); AIG Haw. Ins. Co. v. Bateman,
923 P.2d 395, 396–97 (Haw. 1996); Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 909 P.2d 553, 555, 558 (Haw.
1995); Cap Rock Elec. Coop. v. Tex. Utils. Elec., 874 S.W.2d 92, 98 n.1, 102–03 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1994); Gonzales v. State, 768 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (directing trial
judge, pursuant to the Judicial Code, to report prosecutor to state bar); State v. Wade, 839 A.2d
559, 562, 565–66 (Vt. 2003) (Johnson, J., concurring) (referring matter to state disciplinary
authority despite majority’s refusal); State v. Hohman, 420 A.2d 852, 855 (Vt. 1980),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Shea, 532 A.2d 571, 572 (Vt. 1987); Covington v.
Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 772 (W. Va. 2003); Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d 391, 405 (W. Va.
1997).
110
McGinniss, supra note 58, at 59 (“State and federal courts have generally failed to
adopt rules, or even informed but reliable policies and practices, to ensure that lawyers’ ethical
violations are consistently reported to disciplinary agencies in the lawyers’ jurisdictions of
licensure. This deficiency needlessly feeds the perception that courts are unwilling to take the
steps necessary to secure full accountability of lawyers for their misconduct and thereby
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ago: “If appellate judges would consistently demand careful and dignified
trial procedures as a prerequisite to criminal conviction, their concern would
be effectively communicated to the trial courts.”111
The duty to report lawyer misconduct does not depend on the outcome
on appeal, as discussed above in Part II.C. Although prosecutorial
misconduct may be considered harmless error, it may nevertheless yet violate
the Professional Rules, because the harmless error doctrine does not set the
standard for determining whether lawyer misconduct is reportable to
disciplinary authorities. This distinction was made explicit by the ABA112 and
cases in which reviewing courts have affirmed convictions and considered
their obligation to report prosecutorial misconduct.113 The United States
protect the public.”).
111
Alschuler, supra note 50, at 675; see also Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery
Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, 677 (2013) (“[C]ommon sense and
experience suggest that the possibility of judicial review encourages compliance with
discovery obligations. Prosecutors are more likely to take the obligations seriously if
noncompliance carries a risk of professional discipline or judicial enforcement.”).
112
ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/2015/May/
Conference/Materials/aba_formal_opnion_09_454.pdf (“Courts as well as commentators
have recognized that the ethical obligations more demanding than the constitutional
obligation. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice likewise acknowledges that prosecutors’
ethical duty of disclosure extends beyond the constitutional obligation.”).
113
See United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 264–65 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Kline, 113
A.3d 202, 213 (D.C. 2015) (“[W]e hold that Rule 3.8(e) [the counterpart to Model Rule 38(d)]
requires a prosecutor to disclose all potentially exculpatory information in his or her
possession regardless of whether that information would meet the materiality requirements of
Bagley, Kyles, and their progeny.”); In re Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 676 (N.D. 2012) (noting
that conviction in disciplinary proceeding’s underlying criminal case was affirmed on the basis
of harmless error in spite of finding that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence).
The Feland Court imposed discipline on the prosecutor, saying:
A prosecutor’s ethical duty to disclose all exculpatory evidence to the defense does not vary
depending upon the strength of the other evidence in the case. . . Rule 3.8(d) does not impose a
materiality element similar to that applied in Brady and [N.D. Rule of Criminal Procedure] 16 . . .
[A] prosecutor’s ethical obligation to disclose under Rule 3.8(d) is broader than the duty under
Brady and Rule 16 and our refusal to grant a new trial in [the underlying case] does not preclude
this disciplinary proceeding[.]

Id. at 678. “[W]e believe adequate protection of the public, particularly those persons accused
of a crime, requires that prosecutors not only refrain from intentionally withholding
exculpatory evidence but that they conform their conduct so they do not knowingly or
negligently withhold such evidence.” Id. at 80. See also Hohman, 420 A.2d at 855 (“Unethical
conduct, however worthy of censure, does not necessarily deprive a defendant of a fair trial,
and is therefore distinguishable from prejudicial error.”); Rosen, supra note 51, at 714 (“An
ethical violation can, and often will, be present even when due process is not violated.”);
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 2 at 64–65; Columbia Note, supra note 94, at 977 (“[T]he
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Attorneys’ Manual emphasizes this distinction.114
While Judicial Code 2.15 calls upon judges to “inform” disciplinary
authorities, discussing prosecutorial deviations in opinions does not satisfy
the rule. For the greatest impact, and to comply with the Judicial Code, the
communication should come directly from the court to the authority.
Chastising prosecutors in appellate opinions and even reversing convictions
for misconduct does not carry the same impact as referral for potential bar
discipline. The threat of disciplinary action, separate from the decision in the
case in which misconduct occurred, sends a powerful message not only to the
lawyer involved who has his reputation and perhaps license at stake, but also
to others who may be tempted to deviate from appropriate standards of
conduct.115

attempt to obtain a verdict by improper means requires disciplining of the attorney, who has
shown that he is not sufficiently aware of the duties of his office. Such a penalty, to be imposed
regardless of the outcome of the trial and appeal and after a determination of the prosecutor’s
culpability, should counteract the temptation to gamble on misconduct to obtain favorable
verdicts.”).
114
USAM § 9-5.001C (“Disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment beyond that
which is constitutionally and legally required. . . .[T]his policy requires disclosure by
prosecutors of information beyond that which is ‘material’ to guilt as articulated in Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), and Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) . . . 1.
Additional exculpatory information that must be disclosed. A prosecutor must disclose
information that is inconsistent with any element of any crime charged against the defendant
or that establishes a recognized affirmative defense, regardless of whether the prosecutor
believes such information will make the difference between conviction and acquittal of the
defendant for a charged crime.” (emphasis in original)); see also DOJ Memo, supra note 107
(“Section 9-5.001 details the Department’s policy regarding the disclosure of exculpatory and
impeachment information and provides for broader disclosures than required by Brady and
Giglio. Prosecutors are also encouraged to provide discovery broader and more comprehensive
than the discovery obligations.”).
115
Rosen, supra note 51, at 736 (“Reviewing more cases will be an empty gesture unless
and until prosecutors face serious discipline for suppressing or falsifying evidence.”);
Slobogin, supra note 60, at 35 (“Reprimand, suspension or disbarment is likely to have much
more of a deterrent effect on a prosecutor than a reversal or a finding that the prosecutor’s
error was harmless.”). Many years ago, Professor John M. Levy of Marshall-Wayne School
of Law made these observations about courts’ teaching role:
[T]here is a connection between the fact that law students do not identify and articulate ethical
questions when they are presented with them in actual practice situations and the fact that courts,
especially appellate courts, do not discuss ethical violations presented by cases before them . . .
Appellate courts in their written opinions must, sua sponte, set out any serious ethical question
which the record or the conduct of the lawyers brings to their attention and, moreover, state that
the question is being referred to the appropriate agency for investigation.

Levy, supra note 100, at 97; see also Part III.I, infra, concerning law schools.
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2. Reviewing court judges should include in their opinions the names of
lawyers who engage in serious or repeated misconduct.
No matter whether reviewing courts affirm or reverse criminal
convictions, they should include in their opinions the names of the offending
lawyers (prosecutors and defense) when the record discloses evidence of
serious or repeated misconduct, along with a description of the wrongful
conduct.116 This has been approved in United States v. Hastings,117 in which
the Supreme Court ruled that when courts of appeal set aside criminal
convictions because prosecutors engaged in misconduct, an acceptable
sanction available is “publicly chast[ening] the prosecutor by identifying him
in its opinion.”118
Professor Peter J. Henning of Wayne State University Law School
discussed an opinion of the Ninth Circuit that reversed a criminal conviction
involving “extensive and continuing prosecutorial misconduct, including
misrepresentations to the trial court by the Assistant United States
Attorney.”119 The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to
consider dismissal due to the severity of the prosecutorial misconduct, but
without disclosing the Assistant’s name.120 Professor Henning asked
rhetorically: “Why withhold the identity of a prosecutor the court found had
essentially lied to the judge and to the defense counsel, and then tried to cover
up the misconduct?”121 In a recent journal article, Judge Alex Kozinski
agreed:
Naming names and taking prosecutors to task for misbehavior can have magical
qualities in assuring compliance with constitutional rights. . . . Judges who see bad
behavior by those appearing before them, especially prosecutors who wield great power
and have greater ethical responsibilities, must hold such misconduct up to the light of
public scrutiny.122

116

See, e.g., Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2015); In re Cook, 49 F.3d
263, 266–68 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Burse, 531 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir. 1976); Cap
Rock Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 874 S.W.2d 92, 98 n.1, 102–03 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994).
117
461 U.S. 499 (1986).
118
Id. at 506 n.5. The court suggested several other disciplinary actions, including
“directing the District Court to order the prosecutor to show cause,” and “asking the
Department of Justice to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against him.” Id.
119 Henning, supra note 60, at 830–31 (citing United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
120
Id.
121
Id.; accord RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 2, at 50.
122
Kozinski, supra note 5, at xxxvi.
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By adopting this practice, reviewing courts will capture the attention of
the trial bar, and confirm that the courts are serious about enforcing the rules
of professional conduct. Judge D. Brooks Smith of the Third Circuit
pointedly observed:
I believe that the overwhelming majority of prosecutors would recoil at the notion of
her or his name being publicly linked to what is, quite plainly, legal wrong-doing.
Judicial opprobrium directed against a lawyer on ethical grounds is not the stuff of
which successful careers are normally built—at least not in the prosecutorial realm.123

Including names of serious offenders in published opinions would also
enable the creation of a database to receive and store judicial reports of
criminal litigation-related lawyer misconduct.124
3. Reviewing courts should use their disciplinary powers in appropriate
cases.
We need not repeat the discussion of courts’ contempt powers contained
above in Part III.A.2. When faced with lawyer misconduct, use of contempt
by appellate courts was recommended a good many years ago, including
cases in which the appellate court affirms the trial court:
When reversal is not warranted, contempt penalties directed specifically against the
prosecutor may be an appropriate and effective remedy. Such a sanction enables the
judge to both maintain the integrity and dignity of the court through immediate action
and ensure that the trial will be free from willful obstruction. Moreover, contempt
penalties allow the judge to fashion a wide variety of sanctions which are commensurate
with the severity of the misconduct displayed.125

Federal reviewing courts may invoke their powers under the Rules of
Appellate Procedure concerning suspension or disbarment.126 State
reviewing courts have similar statutory, rule, and inherent authority.127
123

Smith, supra note 95, at 842. See also Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public
Humiliation of Prosecutors by Judges to Correct Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 305 (2016) (evaluating and providing examples of shaming as a deterrent to
prosecutorial misconduct).
124
McGinniss, supra note 58, at 74.
125
Rona Feinberg, The Second Circuit Reacts to Prosecutorial Misconduct, 49 BROOK. L.
REV. 1245, 1263 (1983); see also United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62, 63 (2d Cir. 1973).
126
FED. R. APP. P. 46(b), (c); see also In re Bagdade, 334 F.2d 568, 571–72 (7th Cir. 2003);
In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 267–68 (7th Cir. 1995) (suspending attorney from Circuit bar for two
years for embezzling client funds from settlement disbursement). See generally Campos v.
Inv. Mgmt. Props., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (assessing ten times the
taxable costs upon appellant).
127
Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United
States, 2008 J. OF THE PROF. LAW. 359, 380–87.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO FEDERAL AND STATE
LEGISLATURES AND SUPREME COURTS

1. The United States Supreme Court, state supreme courts, and legislatures
should require open file discovery in all felony cases and restrict the
harmless error rule.
The proximate cause of much of the prosecutorial misconduct described
in this article is traceable to the fundamental fault in the Supreme Court’s
holding in Brady v. Maryland,128 a fault that has been exacerbated by the
Court’s formulation of the harmless error rule. Grounded upon the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution,
and therefore binding in both federal and state court criminal cases,129 Brady
requires the prosecution to make pretrial disclosures to the defense of
evidence in the possession of the prosecution including the police and
government agencies. The mandatory disclosures are anything that is
“exculpatory,” “material,” or “favorable to the defense” regarding the
defendant’s guilt or innocence, or potential penalties to be imposed in the
event of a conviction.130 It is a prime example of a well-meaning reform gone
bad, for several reasons:
a. The fundamental conflict of interest inherent in the Brady rule.
The first defect is that in formulating the Brady rule, the Court gave the
prosecution the discretion to determine, prior to trial, what evidence must be
produced, even though the defense has the better vantage point to decide what
is “favorable.”131 The prosecution is thus called upon to make value
128

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 86.
130
See id. at 87. The Supreme Court has abandoned the difference in the federal test for
reversal for non-compliance with Brady based upon whether there was no request, a general
request, or a specific request made for the exculpatory evidence that was not produced. United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). Some
form of the Brady rule has been adopted in each state, though these rules are subject to a
number of exceptions and refinements. GERSHMAN, supra note 41, §§ 5.2–5.22.
131 Imagine a professional sporting event in which one of the contestants is permitted to
make the close calls—whether it was a ball or strike, whether the tennis ball was in or out,
whether the tackle was offside, etc.—without oversight by an independent umpire.
As to the prosecutors’ dual, competing roles—to win the case and to see that justice is
done—Professor Henning has said:
129

The prosecutor labors under the pull of two divergent forces created by the ethical precepts. One
of these forces requires an attorney to advocate passionately the government's position, while the
other pushes the prosecutor to seek a result that may not be exactly what the client and the attorney
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judgments that ought to be within the province of the defense lawyer. The
tests for production—“favorable,” “exculpatory,” “material”—are imprecise
and value laden, leaving a great deal of room for the exercise of prosecutorial
judgment. In Brady, the Supreme Court appeared to overlook the obvious
conflict of interest this doctrine creates between the prosecutor-advocate who
has confidence in his indictment and wants a conviction, and the defense
lawyer-advocate, who has an entirely different viewpoint and approach to the
case, and wants an acquittal.
Apart from the conflicting interests, in making his determination as to
production, the prosecutor cannot know the potential uses the defense lawyer
may have for the evidence. What may not appear useful to the prosecutor
may be useful for defense counsel. The prosecutor is exposed to the natural
condition of cognitive bias, which is common to litigators on both sides of
disputed cases.132 He is convinced in the justice of his indictment. He may
never have defended a criminal case, and therefore may be unable to put
himself in the defense lawyer’s position.133 Justice John Paul Stevens, who

desire: a conclusion short of a criminal conviction. Therefore, at the core of a prosecutor's function
lies a potentially irreconcilable conflict between doing justice—which the ethical codes do not
define—and the prosecutor's role as the government's primary advocate in the criminal justice
system.

Henning, supra note 60, at 727–28.
132
KATHLEEN “COOKIE” RIDOLFI ET AL., MATERIAL INDIFFERENCE: HOW COURTS ARE
IMPEDING FAIR DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL CASES 22 (2014), http://www.nacdl.org/report/
materialindifference/pdf/.
As to prosecutors’ potential cognitive bias and inability to evaluate the importance of
evidence when seen through the eyes of the defense lawyer, see Kozinski, supra note 5, at
xxvii (“[I]t’s not in [prosecutors] hearts to help the other side.”); David W. Ogden, Foreword
to RIDOLFI ET AL., supra, at viii (“[Prosecutors as] advocates pursuing a valid and important
goal [to convict those they believe are guilty] may tend to view things through a particular
lens, no matter how hard they try to get their calls right.”).
In the opinion of one of the authors, based upon his personal experience as both a former
U.S. Attorney and as a defense attorney, it is obvious that even the most honorable prosecutors
have a built-in conflict of interest in deciding what to produce to the defense before trial. This
opinion is supported by the myriad cases of undisclosed exculpatory evidence in the Registry
of Exonerations. While withholding the evidence may not be deliberate—after all, many
prosecutors have never defended a criminal case and will not know what is relevant to the
defense—the errors from nondisclosure are too costly and is a major reason why defense
lawyers should have open access to files of prosecutors and law enforcement, subject to certain
limitations. See discussion regarding open file discovery, infra.
133
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976). Professor Ridolfi made the same point
in different words:
Prosecutors are ill-equipped to apply a post-trial standard to a pre-trial obligation without the
benefit of the defense perspective and with their natural biases as zealous advocates. . . . Even for
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was a trial lawyer before being appointed to the bench, pointed out what
experienced trial lawyers know: “The significance of an item of evidence can
seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete[.]”134
b. A decision not to disclose usually means the evidence will never
become known to the defense lawyer or the courts.
The second flaw in the Brady rule is that the prosecutor is not required
to advise the defense lawyer what he has deemed not exculpatory and
therefore has decided not to produce, nor is he required to seek the advice of
the court as to his obligation to produce. Accordingly, in the vast majority of
cases, it is likely that the existence of the evidence in question will never
become known to the defense or to the courts adjudicating the case.135
c. If the evidence is discovered after conviction, the harmless error rule
limits the basis for reversal.
The final irony of the Brady rule comes into play if, after conviction, the
prosecutor’s failure to produce exculpatory evidence is disclosed. The
harmless error rule—a form of which is used in all state and federal courts—
then comes into play. Faced with the prosecutor’s failure to make pretrial
production of exculpatory evidence, the trial or reviewing court is called upon
to determine whether, in light of all the evidence, “there is a reasonable
probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding
would have been different,” which means “the likelihood of a different result
is great enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
[conviction].”136 The court imagines the trial that should have occurred, with
the evidence produced to the defense, and compares it to the one that took

the most ethical prosecutor, application of the materiality standard is not done in a vacuum and
rarely considers the defense perspective—the application is unfairly influenced by the prosecutor’s
theory of the case, even if inadvertent.

RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 132, at xv, 22. It is the case that many sources of authority instruct
prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure. E.g., Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (“[T]he prudent
prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure”); DOJ Memo, supra note
107. However, these instructions have not taken root in many prosecutorial offices. See
Kozinski, supra note 5, at viii (noting “an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land”).
134
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (Stevens, J.).
135
The National Registry of Exonerations includes cases in which years passed before the
exculpatory evidence was discovered, although it was known to the prosecutor before trial but
not produced to the defense. This has led to many exonerations after wrongfully convicted
defendants have served many years of confinement. See generally UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH.,
supra note 6.
136
Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2012) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
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place, with the evidence withheld. The court evaluates the differences
between the two trials, one real and the other hypothetical, and reaches an
opinion as to what might have resulted if the prosecutor had produced the
evidence. The court is invited to ignore the prosecution’s pretrial breach of
the obligation to produce exculpatory evidence and excuse the prosecutor’s
failure to make exculpatory evidence available based upon a post-trial record.
Thus, judges, sworn to uphold the Constitution, are called upon to apply a
lesser standard of the process due to some defendants compared to others—
that is, the stronger the prosecution’s case compared to the defense, the lesser
value is attributed to the right of the defendant to a fair trial without regard
to the relative weight of the evidence.
In the great majority of federal and state appellate rulings involving
allegations about non-production of exculpatory evidence, the reviewing
courts have held that the alleged Brady violations were harmless error. Justice
Stevens called attention to the significant difference in the pretrial and posttrial tests applicable to production of exculpatory evidence:
[T]here is a significant practical difference between the pretrial decision of the
prosecutor and the post-trial decision of the judge. Because we are dealing with an
inevitably imprecise standard, and because the significance of an item of evidence can
seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the prudent
prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure. But to reiterate a
critical point, the prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure
unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s
right to a fair trial.137

Despite Justice Stevens’ suggestion that “the prudent prosecutor will
resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure,”138 many commentators
have concluded that there are prosecutors who have treated the stringent
after-the-fact “materiality” test as an invitation to narrow their pretrial
disclosures—to withhold arguably exculpatory evidence at the trial level, in
the expectation that if the defendant is convicted and the undisclosed
evidence is discovered, the court will rule that the failure to disclose was
harmless and therefore not grounds for reversal.139 There is persuasive
evidence to support this conclusion. For example, in a 2014 study of over 600
appellate decisions involving alleged violations of the prosecutor’s duty to

137

Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107–08 (Stevens, J.).
Id.
139
See, e.g., Gershman II, supra note 60, at 713 (“[B]y placing the burden of establishing
the constitutional violation on the defendant, the Court reversed the well-settled rule that
requires the beneficiary of a constitutional error—i.e., the prosecutor—to demonstrate the
harmlessness of his violation. By shifting the burden, the Court afforded the prosecutor an
added perverse incentive to conceal evidence.” (footnotes omitted)).
138
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make pretrial production of exculpatory evidence to the defense, the authors
concluded:
Taking cues from the way in which courts analyze Brady claims in the post-trial context,
the prosecutor’s inquiry becomes not whether a piece of information is favorable, but
instead whether the information would have made a difference in the outcome of the
case. The judiciary’s almost unilateral focus on materiality conveys a message that nonmaterial favorable information is unimportant and need not be disclosed. As a result,
the current system of judicial review fails to promote a culture of compliance, instead
fostering Brady, or “so-called Brady,” violations.140

In a 2013 dissent from an order denying a petition for rehearing en banc
in United States v. Olsen, then-Chief Judge Kozinski, joined by four judges
on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, concluded that, “Brady violations
have reached epidemic proportions in recent years, and the federal and state
reporters bear testament to this unsettling trend.”141 After listing twenty eight
reported appellate opinions involving breaches between 2003 and 2013, he
concluded: “When such transgressions are acknowledged yet forgiven by the
courts, we endorse and invite their repetition.”142 The court “invites
prosecutors to avert their gaze from exculpatory evidence” by requiring an
“impossibly high” materiality standard to be met before a conviction will be
reversed.143 Over the years, a number of legal scholars have called attention
to this phenomenon.144
140

RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 132, at 44.
United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013).
142
Id. at 632.
143
Id. at 633. Judge Kozinski recently elaborated on these remarks, including his
recommendations that trial court judges “[e]nter Brady compliance orders in every criminal
case . . . [e]ngage in a Brady colloquy . . . [and a]dopt local rules that require the government
to comply with its discovery obligations without the need for motions by the defense.”
Kozinski, supra note 5, at xxxiii–xxxiv (emphasis removed).
144 See, e.g., Gershman II, supra note 60, at 727–28 (“The development of the Brady rule
by the judiciary depicts a gradual erosion of Brady: from a prospective obligation on
prosecutors to make timely disclosure to the defense of materially favorable evidence, to a
retrospective review by an appellate court into whether the prosecutor’s suppression was
unduly prejudicial. The erosion of Brady has been accompanied by increasing prosecutorial
gamesmanship in gambling that violations will not be discovered or, if discovered, will be
allowed, [as well as] tactics that abet and hide evidence.”); Rosen, supra note 51, at 707–08
(“As a consequence of the materiality standards, a prosecutor knows that a decision to
withhold or falsify evidence, even if discovered, will not necessarily result in a reversal of the
conviction. This is true no matter how flagrant or intentional the prosecutor’s misconduct.”);
Leonard Sosnov, Brady Reconstructed: An Overdue Expansion of Rights and Remedies, 45
N.M. L. REV. 171, 190–91 (“Under this constitutional paradigm, police and prosecutors face
no constitutional pressure to disclose even obviously exculpatory evidence if they believe that
it will not alter the outcome of the trial. . . . It makes little sense to have a constitutional
141
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This potential for conflating the pre- and post-trial tests for production
was pointed out by the Court of Appeals of New York:
[A] backward-looking, outcome-oriented standard of review that gives dispositive
weight to the strength of the People’s case clearly provides diminished incentive for the
prosecutor, in first responding to discovery requests, thoroughly to review files for
exculpatory material, or to err on the side of disclosure where exculpatory value is
debatable.145

In Olsen, then-Chief Judge Kozinski and his fellow judges pointed out
another risk caused by using vague terminology to define prosecutors’
obligations to produce exculpatory evidence, coupled with forgiving
appellate “harmless error” review: the likelihood that materials not produced
at trial will never be discovered, or will come to light after the defendant has
spent years in prison. The post-trial discovery of a Brady violation is “highly
unlikely” to be discovered by any party, and “[t]his creates a serious moral
hazard for those prosecutors who are more interested in winning a conviction
than serving justice.”146 Another deleterious effect of the harmless error rule,
as identified by Professor Gershman and relevant to all types of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, is that it “encourages the view that the courts, by
condoning prosecutorial lawlessness, are themselves promoting disrespect
for the law.”147
Drastic adverse consequences to the fair administration of criminal
justice have resulted directly from this perversion of the Brady rule. Professor
Brandon L. Garrett, who analyzed reviewing court opinions upholding the
convictions of defendants who were convicted, imprisoned, and later
exonerated, found that thirty eight percent of exonerees in his study had a
harmless error or “no prejudice” ruling in their post-conviction
proceedings—or both.148
A few years ago, Professor Alafair S. Burke analyzed over forty five
years of Brady-related rulings. He writes:

doctrine that excuses government actors’ intentional withholding of favorable exculpatory or
impeachment evidence, so long as it is not material.”).
145
People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y. 1990).
146
Olsen, 737 F.3d at 630. Other legal scholars agree. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke,
Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 489 (2009) (“If they [prosecutors]
intentionally suppress evidence that might jeopardize a conviction, they can do so in the
comfort of knowing there is little chance the evidence will ever come to light and therefore
only a remote possibility of a challenge to their decision to withhold it.”).
147
GERSHMAN, supra note 41 § 14:4.
148
GARRETT, supra note 60, at 201.
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Much of the blame for Brady’s failure to protect the innocent has been laid at the doors
of the prosecutors charged with the doctrine’s effectuation. Commentators argue that
Brady has become a “paper tiger,” frequently and blatantly disregarded by prosecutors
who have come to realize that they can suppress exculpatory evidence with few
repercussions other than higher rates of conviction.149

After analyzing cases dealing with prosecutors’ responding to defense
demands for production of evidence pursuant to Brady, Professor Burke
concludes:
The exonerations of more than two hundred criminal defendants based on postconviction DNA evidence have forced an acknowledgement that not only our justice
system convicts the innocent, but also that prosecutorial suppression of Brady material
constitutes a leading cause of wrongful convictions. . . . [N]early half of the cases in
which innocent defendants have been exonerated based on post-conviction DNA
evidence involved prosecutorial misconduct, and more than a third of the misconduct
involved the nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence.150

The problems inherent in the harmless error rule are long standing and
well known, and are not limited only to breaches of the Brady rule. In the real
world of criminal prosecutions, reviewing court opinions that call attention
to prosecutorial violations of established rules but nevertheless affirm
convictions have little or no deterrent value, and in many instances have had
the effect of emboldening aggressive prosecutors.151
Over thirty years ago, in United States v. Hastings,152 a majority of the
Supreme Court conceded that the prosecutor’s closing argument, in which
the prosecutor alluded to the defendant’s failure to testify, violated the
defendant’s constitutional rights,153 but reversed the Seventh Circuit’s order
for a new trial because the majority was “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error relied upon was harmless.”154 In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined
by Justice Marshall, made these observations, which are applicable to the
many cases involving Brady violations that are nevertheless affirmed based
on harmless error:

149

Burke, supra note 146, at 482–83.
Id. at 509–10. Professor Burke concludes, as do we, that open file discovery is the
appropriate requirement for prosecutorial disclosure. Id. at 518–19.
151
See United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256 (3d Cir. 1984), and United States v.
Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1185 (2d Cir. 1961), for exasperated warnings of appellate court
judges. See also Gershman II, supra note 60, at 728; Rosen, supra note 51, at 736; Steele supra
note 54, at 977; Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 285 n.48.
152
461 U.S. 499 (1983).
153
Id. at 506.
154
Id. at 512.
150

5. SULLIVAN FINAL TO PRINTER

11/29/2016 6:53 PM

2015] DISCIPLINING PROSECUTORS—REFORM PROPOSALS

921

If Government prosecutors have engaged in a pattern and practice of intentionally
violating defendants’ constitutional rights, a court of appeals certainly might be justified
in reversing a conviction, even if the error at issue is harmless, in an effort to deter
future violations . . . it is certainly arguable that the public’s interest in preserving
judicial integrity, and in insuring that Government prosecutors, as its agents, refrain
from intentionally violating defendants’ rights are stronger than its interests in
upholding the conviction of a particular defendant.155

The combination of the Brady rule’s inherent lack of clarity, and
potential for secret non-disclosure, coupled with the vagaries of the harmless
error rule when applied to prosecutorial misconduct, have led to a great deal
of needless and costly litigation, with the results often dependent, as they
used to say, upon the length of the chancellor’s foot.156
The system needs change, now. We therefore submit the following
reforms so that both the Brady and harmless error rules are abandoned or
substantially reformulated:157
• Open file discovery. As to Brady, we recommend that federal and state
supreme courts and legislatures adopt rules and legislation requiring the
prosecution to provide open file discovery. “Open file discovery” means
making available to the defense the prosecutor’s entire file and those of all
investigative agencies, rather than allowing the prosecution to exercise
discretion over such disclosures, without the defense counsel’s knowledge or
court approval. Exceptions to the prosecutor’s duty to disclose may be
presented by the prosecutor serving a motion on defense counsel that states
that the prosecutor will present the information he wishes to be protected for
an in camera inspection by the court without defense counsel present.
Justifications for non-disclosure include matters that would: endanger
witnesses from retaliation or intimidation; interfere with ongoing
investigations; or result in substantial harm to an individual or the public
interest. 158
The benefit of open file discovery is that it removes the determination
of disclosure from the prosecutor after he evaluates each piece of evidence
155

Id. at 527.
See JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick Pollock ed., Quaritch
1927) (1689) (“One Chancellor [has] a long foot, another [a] short foot[,] a third an indifferent
foot; tis [the] same thing in [a] Chancellor’s Conscience.”).
157
Whether or not our recommendations are adopted in the federal system, the harmless
error rule is not binding upon state courts. State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Minn. 1992).
As to Brady, each state is authorized to call for clearer formulation and stricter enforcement
of the rules for production of exculpatory evidence at every stage of criminal proceedings.
People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 919 (N.Y. 1990).
158
See discussion in Burke, supra note 146, at 516.
156
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or information and tests it against local discovery rules as well as Brady and
its progeny. The process gives a substantial measure of assurance to the trial
judge and defense lawyer that there has been a good faith effort to provide
the defense with the government’s complete file.159
An open file policy is not a panacea because it will still be subject to
what the prosecutor’s file contains. But it should severely limit the myriad
disputes that occur in both trial and reviewing courts concerning the
completeness and fairness of the materials produced by the prosecution, and
the necessity for retrials when the courts determine there has been inadequate
disclosure. It will also protect against the scandalous delays in discovery of
exculpatory evidence until years after the original trial, appeal, and
imprisonment.160
• Narrow the harmless error rule. A more stringent formulation of the
harmless error rule is needed to get the attention of the relatively few
prosecutors who do not adhere to the principle that their primary duty is to
see that justice is done, rather than racking up a record of convictions. We
recommend that if errors occur during criminal trials owing to misconduct of
law enforcement personnel, including not producing exculpatory evidence,
new trials should be ordered unless the court is convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error (1) was not due to intentional conduct on the
part of law enforcement personnel, and (2) did not affect the defendant’s right
to a fair trial.161

159
For excellent discussions of the need for, and positive results attained from, open-file
discovery, see Burke, supra note 146, at 515–19; Green, supra note 111, at 622–82; Daniel S.
Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1557–67 (2010); Robert P.
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The
Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 272–76, 306–
09 (2008); Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to
Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1140–45
(2004).
160
One of the authors, a former federal prosecutor, poses the same rhetorical question put
by Professor Weeks: “What is there, after all, that argues in favor of any limit on disclosure
by a prosecutor?” Weeks, supra note 60, at 913 (emphasis in original). Why, in criminal cases,
with freedom and reputations at risk, is pretrial discovery not the same as in civil litigation
involving disputes about monetary awards?
161
Similar provisions are contained in the Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012,
a bill introduced by Senator Lisa Murkowski after dismissal of the indictment of Senator Ted
Stevens. It provides that on appeal, “the reviewing court may not find an error arising from
conduct not in compliance with this section to be harmless unless the United States
demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.” Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 3014). See Green, supra note 111, at 652–54 (discussing multiple
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Further, unless it is clear that the prosecutor’s misconduct was not
intentional and did not affect the outcome, the court should refer the matter
to disciplinary authorities, with the transgressor’s name included. These stern
policies are needed to send clear messages to the few errant prosecutors that
they must conform their conduct to applicable rules.
2. Federal and state supreme courts and legislatures should provide that
prosecutors have qualified rather than absolute immunity from civil
damage actions.
Another major impediment to inhibiting prosecutorial misconduct is the
Supreme Court rule, also adopted by many states, that grants absolute
immunity to prosecutors from civil damages in suits based upon their conduct
undertaken in pursuance of their prosecutorial functions.162 The Supreme
Court adopted this rule in its 1976 decision in Imbler, which held that federal
and state prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil actions brought
under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.163 As a result,
wrongfully convicted and imprisoned defendants—such as in Cleveland,
Ohio,164 and New Orleans, Louisiana,165 both home to well-documented cases
of prosecutors’ scandalous behavior and flouting of ethics rules—have no
civil remedy available against their unscrupulous prosecutors.
One of the Court’s justifications for this holding is relevant to the subject
of this article. After pointing out that a prosecutor may be subject to criminal
prosecution under certain extreme circumstances, the Court added:
Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could
deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by
an association of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that the imposition
of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the
constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.166

benefits of the legislation); RIDOLFI ET AL., supra note 132, at 50–51 (same).
162
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
163
Id. at 427. Absolute immunity applies when prosecutors “act[] as advocates,”
performing functions intimately connected with the judicial phase of the criminal proceeding
and have qualified immunity when they act as “investigators or administrators,” which
requires that the civil plaintiff must defeat any criminal charges, and prove that the prosecutor
violated clearly established constitutional law with a culpable state of mind. Johns, supra note
60, at 521.
164
See Brett, supra note 7.
165
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71–72 (2011).
166
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429.
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In 2011, in a § 1983 case against a notorious state prosecutor from New
Orleans, the Court overturned a multi-million dollar verdict for the victim on
the basis of absolute immunity.167 Justice Clarence Thomas repeated the
Imbler reference to the prosecutor’s risk of professional discipline as a
deterrent from abusing his authority.168
As we have shown in Part I, the Supreme Court assumes the existence
of a robust disciplinary system, which is not the reality throughout the
country.169 In the absence of meaningful enforcement of federal and state
disciplinary systems, as discussed above, there is no monetary sanction to
dissuade repeat offenders or their employers. But as discussed below, many
knowledgeable commentators have pointed out that prosecutorial immunity
from civil liability provides an additional incentive for prosecutors to play
fast and loose with their ethical obligations. They argue that serious
consideration should be given to replacing absolute with qualified immunity,
or alternatively completely eradicating immunity in cases of deliberate
violations of defendants’ rights. For example, Professor Joseph R. Weeks of
Oklahoma City University School of Law writes:
Well considered arguments have been advanced to support the overruling of Imbler.
Until this occurs, however, the conclusion for our purposes is that the prospect of a civil
suit under federal law for a Brady violation does not exist. We will have to look
elsewhere to discover the incentive for prosecutors to comply with their constitutional
obligations to disclose exculpatory evidence. 170

Judge Kozinski added his support to this reform recently. He calls
attention to the justifications for immunity asserted in the Imbler case—that

167

Connick, 563 U.S. at 66–68.
Id. at 66 (“An attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is subject to
professional discipline, including sanctions, suspension, and disbarment.”).
169
Zacharias, supra note 50, at 777 (“Imbler v. Pachtman’s reference to the existence of
professional discipline as grounds for immunizing prosecutors from legal action and
constitutional review has been repeated in subsequent cases [but] Imbler’s premise is not
realistic. Bar authorities do not, and probably cannot, fill the void in prosecutorial oversight
across the board.”).
170
Weeks, supra note 60, at 877–78; see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The
Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors,
89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2009) (“Standing alone, the disciplinary process will never
adequately hold errant prosecutors accountable for their role in bringing about wrongful
convictions. These conclusions belie the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Imbler that
professional regulation serves as an effective alternative to the civil liability regime. Although
enforcement can be enhanced, discipline will never come close to playing the lead role in
constraining prosecutorial misconduct that the Court assigns to it.”).
168
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prosecutors are subject to criminal prosecution for their misdeeds, as well as
discipline for their misconduct.171 Judge Kozinski concludes, and we agree:
This argument was dubious in 1976 and is absurd today. . . . It is a disparity that can
only be explained by the fact that prosecutors and judges are all part of the legal
profession and it’s natural enough to empathize with people who are just like you. If
the Supreme Court won’t overrule Imbler . . . Congress is free to do so by amending 42
U.S.C. § 1983.172

As with the harmless error rule, the federal absolute immunity doctrine
in § 1983 suits is based upon application of federal law, not constitutional
principles, and therefore need not be followed in civil actions brought under
state law. Accordingly, each state may adopt whatever version of immunity,
or no immunity, shall be given to prosecutors while engaged in their official
duties. Professor Margaret Z. Johns of the University of California, Davis,
School of Law, has demonstrated the questionable validity of the historical
rationale for granting absolute immunity to prosecutors in Imbler, and the
difficulty in many cases of determining whether absolute or qualified
immunity applies.173 Following a comprehensive analysis of the subject, she
has made a straightforward recommendation for an alternative rule—which
we endorse—for adoption by state courts and legislatures, and by the
Supreme Court or Congress, of qualified immunity.174 Qualified immunity
“would protect honest prosecutors from unwarranted litigation while

171

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428–29 (“[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional
discipline by an association of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that the
imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the
constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.” (footnotes omitted)).
172
Kozinski, supra note 5, at xxxix–xli.
173
Johns, supra note 60, at 521–34.
174
Id. at 535. See also Williams, supra note 60, at 3471 (“By applying absolute immunity
to trial-related misconduct, the courts have again immunized prosecutors for behavior that is
unethical but for which prosecutors are not often subject to disciplinary review.”). “Qualified
immunity is sufficient to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Qualified immunity
would continue to protect the well-intentioned prosecutor from liability, but would hold liable
those who willfully violate federal statutory or constitutional rights.” Id. at 3480. See also
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 2, at 75 (“As the Supreme Court has noted in other contexts,
the qualified immunity defense ‘provides ample protection to all.’” (quoting Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986))). “Qualified immunity protects government officials . . . from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Id. at 81 (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
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affording victims of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct a remedy for the
willful violation of their civil rights.”175
D. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO PROSECUTORS: ADOPT AND
INSTILL IN THE OFFICE A CULTURE OF INTEGRITY AND
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Prosecutors are heavily invested in maintaining public confidence in the
criminal justice system. They have great credibility; they wear “white hats.”
It is their responsibility to rid their ranks of those who sully their well-earned
reputations for honorable dealing. An important recommendation, which we
wholeheartedly adopt, is the creation of an office “ethical atmosphere”—a
culture which emphasizes ethical values in hiring and training; provides
incentives for honorable, open behavior; and disciplines those who do not
follow the rules.176 In his book Prosecution Complex, Professor Daniel S.
Medwed concludes that an ethical culture is “key” to increasing the
likelihood that prosecutors’ offices will carry out justice.177
The Prosecution Standards of the National District Attorneys
Association acknowledges the high ethical standards that bind prosecutors,
describing the prosecutor’s Primary Responsibility as: “The prosecutor is an
independent administrator of justice. The primary responsibility of a
prosecutor is to seek justice, which can only be achieved by the representation
and presentation of truth.”178
Written policies, available to the public, are a fundamental starting
point.179 Continuing education programs are also essential, particularly for
newly-hired assistants.180
175

Id.
This has been emphasized by a number of writers. See, e.g., Joy, supra note 60, at 424
(“Implementing internal policies that value ethical conduct, and implementing and enforcing
internal discipline when those norms are violated, would go a long way toward addressing the
issue of prosecutorial misconduct.”).
177
DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 170 (2011) (“In the end, maintaining an ethical culture within
prosecutors’ offices is the key to enhancing the likelihood that justice will prevail. . . . Instead
of emphasizing the black letter of legal doctrine and the techniques of advocacy above all, a
premium should be placed on ethics and the importance of empathizing with clients as well as
adversaries.”); see also Medwed, supra note 159, at 1566–67.
178
NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 82 § 1-1.1.
179
For example, the U.S. Department of Justice adopted a detailed memorandum for
Department prosecutors regarding procedures to be followed relating to discovery in criminal
cases. See DOJ Memo, supra note 107; see also Kirchmeier et al., supra note 60, at 1365–69.
180
Genson & Martin, supra note 60, at 59 (“It is incumbent upon the office of the
176
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Prosecutorial conduct that appears to violate Professional Rule 3.8(f) is
commonly not sanctioned or even questioned by disciplinary authorities.
That rule provides that prosecutors in criminal cases shall:
[E]xcept for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent
of the prosecutor’s action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain
from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening
public condemnation of the accused[.]181

The violations routinely include “perp walks,” in which defendants,
most of whom are not flight risks, are paraded in handcuffs as they are led by
law enforcement officers to the courthouse for fingerprinting and
arraignment. These media spectacles are often followed by press conferences
in which grim-faced, self-congratulatory prosecutors outline their evidence
and depict the defendants in prejudicial terms. Rarely is any mention made
that the defendants are presumed to be innocent, and that the prosecution has
the burden of proving the defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in
court.182 Top law enforcement lawyers in both the federal and state systems
often piously and publicly declaim unproven charges, with no questions
raised about their apparent violations of the applicable rules of professional
conduct.
American Bar Association Formal Opinion 467 deals with the
responsibilities of supervisory personnel in prosecutors’ offices, including a
supervisor’s potential vicarious liability for subordinates’ misconduct that
the supervisor orders, ratifies, or fails to remedy.183 The opinion recommends
training in the professional rules applicable to prosecutors, as well as staying
advised of and requiring periodic reports on pending cases.184 Internal office
discipline does not relieve state and federal prosecutors of their duty to report

prosecutor to implement mandatory continuing education programs designed to educate its
attorneys about prosecutorial misconduct. Such programs could feature lectures by judges,
veteran prosecutors, disciplinary authorities, and others active in the field of professional
responsibility.”).
181
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(f) (2009); see also id. r. 3.6 (restricting trial
publicity by both the prosecution and defense).
182
See, e.g., Rick Rojas, 25 Charged in Heroin Trafficking Ring in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/nyregion/25-charged-in-herointrafficking-ring-in-brooklyn.html?_r=0; Transcript: Justice Department Briefing on
Blagojevich Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/
us/politics/09text-illinois.html?pagewanted=all.
183
ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 14-467 (2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba
_formal_opinion_467.pdf.
184
Id.
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evidence of serious lawyer misconduct to local disciplinary authorities,
pursuant to the rules set out in Part II above. They may be reluctant to report
friends and colleagues,185 but these professional obligations accompany their
law licenses and public positions. Prosecutors’ reporting responsibilities are
set out in the National Prosecution Standards of the National District
Attorneys Association:
1-1.6 Duty to Respond to Misconduct: A prosecutor is obligated to respond to
professional misconduct that has, will, or has the potential to interfere with the proper
administration of justice:
...
c. If despite a prosecutor’s best efforts, no action is taken in accordance with the prior
procedures to remedy the misconduct [by reporting within the prosecutor’s own office,
see §§ a and b], a prosecutor should report the misconduct to appropriate officials
outside the prosecutor’s office (to the extent permitted by the law and rules of ethical
conduct of the state).
d. A prosecutor’s failure to report known misconduct may itself constitute a violation
of the prosecutor’s professional duties.186

E. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO DEFENSE LAWYERS

As noted in Part II above, defense lawyers are required to report serious
violations of the Professional Rules by other lawyers, including prosecutors
and fellow defense lawyers, regardless of how distasteful this may be. And,
as demonstrated in Part II.D, failure to report when required may itself be a
violation of the rules.
In the materials cited in Part I, we have discussed the difficulties many
defense lawyers have in obtaining full pretrial disclosure from prosecutors.
There are ways to alleviate this problem.
185
Keenan et al., supra note 59, at 210–11. See generally Steele, supra note 54, at 978–79
(arguing that it is hard for defense attorneys and judges to report prosecutors due to fear of
retaliation or other consequences); Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools
in Addressing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 426 (2011) (same).
186
NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 82 § 1-1.6. This warning echoes the
judicial rulings cited in Part II.D above. It is applicable as well to judges, law clerks, and
defense lawyers who have knowledge of other lawyers’ misconduct. Those who represent the
accused are an integral part of the criminal justice system. They too have serious ethical and
professional duties, not only to their clients, but also to the system. They are required and
expected to comply with their obligations imposed by the Rules of Professional Conduct,
including those relating to candor to the tribunal, fairness to opposing parties and counsel,
impartiality and decorum to the tribunal, trial publicity truthfulness, and maintaining the
integrity of the profession. Under Rule 8.3 they must report serious misconduct by both
prosecutors and fellow defense lawyers. See PROFESSIONAL RULES r. 8.3.
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First, a pretrial motion asking the trial court to enter an order requiring
the prosecution to comply with the holdings of the Supreme Court in Brady
v. Maryland187 and Giglio v. United States could address this problem, as two
experts have suggested:188
File a pretrial motion that tracks and cites the relevant ethical rule of the defense
attorney’s jurisdiction or in the case of federal prosecutors, the rule that applies to the
state where the prosecutor is based and/or governs the federal proceeding. Ask for an
order that the prosecutor search her file for information that “tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigates the offense . . . .” [T]he motion should ask for an order that
clearly states that “willful and deliberate failure to comply” is punishable by
contempt.189

In advancing this idea, Professor Barry Scheck and Judge Nancy Gertner
point out that this form of motion would create a remedy for defense counsel
if a prosecutor does something to merit sanctioning, by violating the judge’s
order.190
Second, a recently published article recommends defense lawyers
request the trial judge to engage in a Brady colloquy even in cases where a
defendant intends to plead guilty.191 In this scenario:
[T]he court should ask the prosecutor a handful of questions on the record to investigate
whether the prosecutor possesses evidence favorable to the defendant that has not been
disclosed. If the court refuses to propound the questions, the defense attorney should
offer an affirmation on the record about what material she requested of the prosecutor
and what, if anything, she received in response. The defense attorney should then invite
the prosecutor to correct any misstatements about the prosecution’s response to the
defendant’s Brady request.192

Professor Jason Kreag concludes that this procedure would increase the
judge’s role in the prosecution’s disclosure decisions, urge compliance with
Brady’s mandate, encourage robust defense preparations, and increase the
likelihood of penalties for prosecutorial wrongdoing.193 He observes that this

187

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (holding that promises of leniency made to government
witnesses must also be disclosed).
189
Barry Scheck & Nancy Gertner, Combatting Brady Violations With an “Ethical Rule”
Order for the Disclosure of Favorable Evidence, 37 CHAMPION 40, 40–41 (2013),
WestlawNext, 37-MAY Champion 40.
190
Id. at 44.
191
Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 50–52 (2014).
192
Id. at 49.
193
Id. at 50.
188
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recommendation “could be implemented today, without passing legislation,
changing the ethical rules, or giving judges additional authority.”194
Third, in 2004, the prestigious American College of Trial Lawyers
(ACTL) made several proposals for amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure relating to pretrial disclosure of favorable information by
the prosecution to the defense.195 The ACTL recounted the failures of many
prosecutors to comply with their obligations under the Brady case and its
counterpart, Rule 16(a)(E) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
requires, “[u]pon a defendant’s request,” the production of items within the
government’s possession that are “material to preparing the defense.”196 The
ACTL argued that prosecutors had inconsistent interpretations of Rule
16(a)(E) and Brady, and many failed to produce relevant, helpful
information, and documents in a timely manner—if at all.197 The ACTL
called attention to the incongruity in discovery practice between civil and
criminal rules applicable in many jurisdictions:
It is anomalous that in civil cases, where generally only money is at stake, access to
information is assured; while, on the contrary, in criminal cases, where liberty is at
issue, the defense is provided far less information. More significantly, in civil cases
violation of the discovery rules is punishable in extreme cases by dismissal; no
comparable sanction exists in criminal cases. 198

Here we advocate a combination of these three proposals, namely, that
in both federal and state criminal cases, defense lawyers should present a
written motion shortly after arraignment requesting an order requiring the
prosecution to disclose in writing all information favorable to the defendant
that is known to the prosecutors or to any agents or law enforcement officers.
Information favorable to the defendant should include all information in
whatever form—whether admissible or not—that tends to: (1) exculpate the
defendant; (2) adversely impact the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses
or evidence; or (3) mitigate the offense or punishment. The motion should
request that the lead prosecutor certify, in writing, that he: (1) has exercised
due diligence in locating the requested information; (2) has disclosed all such
information to the defense; (3) is aware of his continued obligation to disclose
all requested information; and (4) will seek out and furnish any additional

194

Id. at 56.
American College of Trial Lawyers, Proposal: Proposed Codification of Disclosure of
Favorable Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 93, 104 (2004) [hereinafter American College].
196
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(E).
197
American College, supra note 195, at 94.
198
Id. at 104.
195
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information favorable to the defense immediately upon it becoming known
to him.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO STATE AND FEDERAL
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITIES

1. State disciplinary authorities should accept and act promptly upon
complaints concerning the conduct of lawyers in criminal cases.
In most states, the primary responsibility for discipline of lawyers is
vested in a commission, often acting under the state supreme court. The
Louisiana Chief Disciplinary Counsel observed the importance of the
disciplinary function to the legal profession:
Self regulation [sic] is no myth. It is at the core of a viable legal profession. The duty
to report ethical misconduct rests within the nucleus of that core, often hidden from
view but as real as are the consequences should we fail; for if we do, “we forfeit that
trust and have no right to enjoy the privilege of self-regulation or the confidence and
respect of the public.”199

But it is clear that during the past four decades, state bar disciplinary
authorities have not adequately ferreted out and taken action regarding
prosecutorial misconduct, even in cases in which courts have cited the
provisions of codes violated, and occasionally publicly identified the
perpetrators.200 One author put it succinctly: “The lack of oversight and
accountability for prosecutorial misconduct needs to be addressed by anyone
interested in remedying prosecutorial misconduct as a factor contributing to
wrongful convictions. A more proactive approach is needed.”201
The widespread failure to discipline prosecutors who engage in
misconduct results in large part from judges and lawyers not reporting
violations, a shortage of disciplinary agency resources, and administrators’
lack of experience with the criminal justice system. An obvious starting point

199

Charles B. Plattsmier, Self Regulation and the Duty to Report Misconduct: Myth or
Mainstay?, 2007 PROF. LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 41, 45 (citing In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239,
1249 (La. 2005)).
200
Davis, supra note 58, at 291 (“The current process has proven totally ineffective in
sanctioning prosecutors who engage in misconduct.”); Keenan et al., supra note 59, at 245
(“[T]he ethics rules governing prosecutorial behavior need to be expanded and strengthened,
and the disciplinary procedures tasked with enforcing them reformed, if our legal system is to
justifiably rely on professional sanctions to deter prosecutorial misconduct.”); Kirchmeier et
al., supra note 60, at 1381–85 (introducing five proposals for reform). These articles contain
thoughtful recommendations for reform of disciplinary processes.
201
Joy, supra note 60, at 427.
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toward a solution is adherence by trial and reviewing courts, prosecutors, and
defense lawyers to the reporting requirements of the applicable rules. But that
is only a first step. Even when reporting is handled as required by the rules,
the system will continue to lack relevance to criminal practitioners and the
judges who handle the cases if the disciplinary agencies do not act promptly.
The disciplinary process should begin with a careful investigation of the
facts, which will often be found in the trial or reviewing court record. If
warranted, written charges should be filed, followed promptly by hearings,
and imposition of appropriate disciplinary sanctions on those found to be
knowingly involved in violations of ethical standards.202 It is also important
that sanctions be reported in bar association and other publications, with the
offenders’ names and positions disclosed.
Another recommendation made by several authors, which may already
be in place in some jurisdictions and with which we concur, is that
disciplinary authorities review judicial opinions and media for references to
lawyer misconduct.203 Further, as noted above, there should be in place in
each jurisdiction a process for publication of the names of those found to have
transgressed the rules of professional conduct, as well as court-created
electronic databases to receive and store reports of lawyer misconduct from
judges.204

202

See Joy, supra note 60, at 424; Rosen, supra note 51, at 736; Zacharias, supra note 50,
at 771–78.
203
See Alschuler, supra note 50, at 671; Rosen, supra note 51, at 735–36; Yaroshefsky,
supra note 57, at 275, 298.
204
McGinniss, supra note 58, at 37. In its Report and Recommendations on Reporting
Misconduct, the California Commission On the Fair Administration of Justice stated: “The
Commission concluded it would also be useful to maintain a county-wide track record, so
particular offices that may have a high rate of prosecutorial misconduct . . . can be identified.”
CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
REPORTING MISCONDUCT 14 (2007) [hereinafter CAL. COMMISSION REPORT],
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/official/OFFICIAL%20REPORT%20
ON%20REPORTING%20MISCONDUCT.pdf. The Commission specified instances of
reportable misconduct by judges with personal knowledge, including: willful
misrepresentation to a court, willful and in bad faith withholding or suppressing exculpatory
evidence which is constitutionally required to be disclosed, and willful presentation of perjured
testimony. Id. at 26–27.
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2. Consideration should be given to establishing separate disciplinary
boards to handle complaints involving the conduct of lawyers in criminal
cases.
A number of commentators have suggested that, because many lawyers
have no experience in the criminal area, separate disciplinary commissions
be established to handle allegations of attorney misconduct in criminal cases,
staffed by people experienced in criminal practice, such as retired judges who
have presided over criminal cases.205 The commission members’ experiences
would be helpful in understanding the practice of criminal law in the
jurisdiction, including “the unique web of discretionary decisions by
prosecutors.”206
We recommend that this proposal be given serious consideration.
3. The United States Attorney General should appoint the Office of the
Inspector General, in place of the Office of Professional Responsibility, to
investigate and report on allegations of misconduct by federal prosecutors.
This recommendation is directed to the current federal DOJ disciplinary
process. We arrived at this conclusion after much consideration, based upon
the following information and analysis.
a. The DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility.
The lawyers who serve in OPR are appointed by the Attorney General.
Relevant to the subject of this article, OPR’s function is to review and
investigate allegations of misconduct by Assistant United States Attorneys
and Criminal Division lawyers that relate to their authority to “investigate,
litigate or provide legal advice”; to report its findings and conclusions to the
Attorney General and other appropriate DOJ officials; and to serve as DOJ’s
contact with state bar disciplinary organizations.207 If OPR finds misconduct,
the Professional Misconduct Review Unit (PMRU) reviews the file and
adjudicates the matter.208 If PMRU determines that OPR’s finding is
supported by the evidence, it makes a disciplinary recommendation.209 There
205
See Davis, supra note 94 at 463–64; see also Kirchmeier, et al., supra note 60, at 1370–
71; Yaroshefsky, supra note 57, at 296–98.
206
MEDWED, supra note 177, at 33.
207
Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Eric Holder to all United States Attorneys, et al., Re:
Creation of the Prof’l Misconduct Review Unit 2 (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
documents/pmru-creation.pdf.
208
Established in Jan. 2011 as an additional level of review within DOJ. Id. at 1.
209
Id. at 2–3.
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are further appeals provided from PMRU’s decision.210 When the disciplinary
process is final, OPR notifies state bar associations of misconduct findings
that have been upheld and that involve the violation of a state bar rule.211
OPR’s annual reports contain summaries of its investigations, with general
descriptions of the alleged misconduct, but lack specifics, such as the
identities of the persons or courts involved, dates, locations, and other factual
detail.
b. The DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG).
During the past several years, criticisms of OPR’s performance have
come from a number of sources, together with calls for transfer of the
oversight of prosecutors to OIG. While the OIG is a part of DOJ, it functions
independently, under the Inspector General Act of 1978.212 OIG is
responsible for investigating allegations of DOJ employee misconduct, with
a single exception—misconduct allegations involving federal prosecutors,
which are handled by OPR.213 This exception has created friction between
the Attorney General and DOJ’s Inspector General, who for several years has
requested that jurisdiction over misconduct allegations concerning federal
210

Id. at 3.
This can be and often is a drawn out process, which is terminated if a subject of the
inquiry leaves government service. A highly publicized example of an extended process
involves the DOJ lawyers alleged to have engaged in misconduct which led to dismissal of the
indictment against Senator Ted Stevens. In 2009, OPR found reckless misconduct as to two
lawyers. Goeke v. Dep’t of Justice, 2015 M.S.P.B. 1, 2 (2015). PMRU concurred and imposed
15- and 45-day suspensions. Id. at 3. On appeal, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reversed
PMRU, owing to an improper change of PMRU lawyers during review. Id. at 3–4. In January
2015, a Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal, and cancelled the
suspensions. Id. at 15–16. After analyzing the facts and applicable law, the Board stated:
211

It may seem at first glance to defy common sense not to subject individuals engaged in what was
characterized as reckless behavior to disciplinary action, especially when that behavior so publicly
compromised the justice system with the consequence of interfering with the electoral process.
However, the fact remains that the Department of Justice voluntarily created and adopted a
disciplinary process not required by any external law, rule, or regulation, and allowed that process
to evolve in practice over time.

Id. at 15. Commenting on this result, Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski released a statement,
saying: “These two attorneys committed serious misconduct in one of the highest profile cases
in a generation. When the Justice Department tried to discipline them, it botched its own
process. This deplorable development undercuts the faith Alaskans may still have in the justice
system.” Dermot Cole, Murkowski “Aghast” at Rejected Suspensions for Stevens Prosecutors,
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.adn.com/article/20150115/murkowskiaghast-rejected-suspensions-stevens-prosecutors.
212
5 U.S.C. APP. §§ 2, 3 (2012).
213
Id. § 8E(b)(3); 28 C.F.R. 0.29e(a) (2014).
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prosecutors be transferred to OIG.214 The Attorney General has opposed the
change. Here is an abbreviated summary of OIG’s recent public statements
and writings on the subject:
The Inspector General appeared before a Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on July 11, 2007.215 His
written statement216 included a lengthy explanation of OIG’s position, in
which he noted that, unlike all other OIGs throughout the federal
government, DOJ’s OIG does not have complete jurisdiction throughout the
agency.217 This limitation prevents OIG from investigating misconduct
allegations involving DOJ attorneys’ actions, and instead assigns this
responsibility to the OPR, an entity that is not statutorily independent and
reports directly to the Attorney General and his Deputy.218 This creates a
conflict of interest in OPR, and contravenes the rationale for establishing
independent Inspectors General.219 OIG operates transparently, while OPR
operates in secret; OPR’s reports, even when they examine matters of
significant public interest, are not publicly released.220 OIG has the means
and expertise to investigate attorneys’ conduct, as is done in all other
government agencies.221 The current limitation of the DOJ OIG’s jurisdiction
is inappropriate, violates the spirit of the OIG Act, and should be changed.222
In the OIG’s December 2013 and November 2014 reports to the
Attorney General, the IG repeated his objections to the “carve out” of DOJ
litigators from OIG’s jurisdiction and called upon Congress to eliminate this
exception from OIG’s investigatory jurisdiction.223

214
Strengthening the Unique Role of the Nation’s Inspectors General: Hearing before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 110th Cong. 27 (2007).
215
Id. at 12–15 (testimony of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen., United States Dept. of
Justice).
216
Id. at 39.
217
Id. at 50–51.
218
Id. at 51.
219
Id. at 14.
220
Id. at 15.
221
Id. at 14.
222
Id. at 15.
223
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing
the Department of Justice—2014, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 10, 2014),
https://oig.justice.gov/challenges/2014.htm; OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., Top Management
and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Justice—2013, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Dec. 20, 2013), https://oig.justice.gov/challenges/2013.htm.
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c. The Government Accountability Office (GAO).
In December 2014, the GAO issued a report entitled Professional
Misconduct: DOJ Could Strengthen Procedures For Disciplining Its
Attorneys. GAO explained it issued the report because federal lawmakers had
inquired about the independence and transparency of DOJ’s misconduct
review and disciplinary procedures.224 Members of Congress and other
stakeholders argued that the lack of transparency surrounding DOJ processes
for investigating misconduct and disciplining prevents attorneys from being
held publicly accountable.225 Congress mandated in its 2013 fiscal year
budget for the department that the GAO review and report on prosecutorial
discipline in the department.226
The GAO report identifies deficiencies in OPR’s performance, such as
the time taken to complete investigations and the lack of documentation of
the final action in several cases.227 GAO’s conclusions include the following:
“[U]ntil DOJ consistently ensures that all attorneys found to have engaged in
misconduct are appropriately disciplined, DOJ cannot effectively address
violations of professional standards.”228
d. The American Bar Association (ABA).
In August 2010, the ABA House of Delegates approved a
recommendation directed to DOJ to (inter alia) make public “as much
information . . . as possible” from completed investigations.229 A report
attached to the resolution noted:
In recent years, however, too little public disclosure has been made regarding OPR’s
investigations and the DOJ disciplinary determinations predicated on them in cases
involving alleged professional misconduct. . . . The non-public nature of DOJ’s
disciplinary determinations deprives the public of information about prosecutors . . .
who are alleged to have engaged in acts that warrant discipline and about how DOJ

224

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT: DOJ COULD
STRENGTHEN FOR DISCIPLINING ITS ATTORNEYS 2–3 (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/
667407.pdf.
225
Id. at 11.
226
Id. at 2–3.
227
Id. at 15, 25–26.
228
Id. at 37–38.
229
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION (2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/100a.au
thcheckdam.pdf.
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responds in such cases. . . . [N]ondisclosure is not justified merely because public
officials might be embarrassed by disclosures.230

e. The Project on Government Oversight (POGO).
POGO, a “nonpartisan independent watchdog” organization that for
several decades has investigated government functions,231 recommended
improvements and reforms after a review of OPR reports for fiscal years 2002
through 2013.232 Its report criticized OPR’s failure to make public the names
of DOJ lawyers who acted improperly, concluding that this insulates OPR
“from meaningful public scrutiny and accountability,”233 and that such
secrecy has “fueled suspicions” that DOJ does not aggressively punish
attorney misconduct.234 POGO noted that even OPR’s longstanding lead
lawyer said publicly in 2007 that OIG is “a quick and efficient office” and
that “given the ‘arguable ineffectiveness or limited effectiveness of the
current [OPR],’ the OIG should take over.”235 POGO called for the DOJ OIG
to be granted authority to investigate misconduct throughout the department,
just like all other agency OIGs: “It’s time to end this wrong-headed exception
and to create more independent oversight of and accountability for DOJ
attorneys.” 236
f. Federal courts.
In United States v. Bowen, Judge Engelhardt of the Eastern District of
Louisiana questioned the quality of OPR’s investigation of prosecutors’
conduct:
Although in the case of Perricone and now Mann, the usual DOJ protocol appears to
require simply placing the matter in the hands of the DOJ’s OPR, such a plan at this
point seems useless. First of all, having the DOJ investigate itself will likely only yield
a delayed yet unconvincing result in which no confidence can rest. If no wrongdoing is
uncovered, it will come as a surprise to no one given the conflict of interest existing
between the investigator and the investigated. Moreover, the Perricone matter has been
230

Id. at REPORT 1–3.
About POGO, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, http://www.pogo.org/about/ (last visited
Nov. 4, 2015).
232
PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, HUNDREDS OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ATTORNEYS
VIOLATED PROFESSIONAL RULES LAWS, OR ETHICAL STANDARDS 2 (2014).
233
Id.
234
Id. at 16.
235
Id. at 17 (quoting Ari Shapiro, Ex-Chief Calls for Scrapping Justice Dept. Watchdog,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 1, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=10634336.
236
Id. at 18.
231
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under investigation for eight months (since March), and yet it comes as a complete
surprise to everyone at DOJ and the U.S. Attorney’s Office that another “poster” exists,
especially one maintaining as high a position in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. It is difficult
to imagine how this could possibly have been missed by OPR, and surely raises
concerns about the capabilities and adequacy of DOJ’s investigatory techniques as
exercised through OPR. In any event, the Court has little confidence that OPR will fully
investigate and come to conclusions with anywhere near the efficiency and certainty
offered by suitable court-approved independent counsel. The Court strongly urges DOJ
to do so post haste. Should DOJ determine not to proceed accordingly, the Court is left
to proceed as it sees fit.237

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the District Court’s criticism
of the DOJ’s response to the prosecutor’s misconduct:
Perricone and Jan Mann both resigned from office with benefits as far as the record
shows, although they were referred for professional discipline to the State Bar of
Louisiana. Dobinski remains in federal employment with only a bare reproof for her
online commenting. Their misdeeds are compounded by the government’s insouciant
investigation, which leaves open only three inferences concerning this prosecutorial
breakdown: the government is not serious about controlling extracurricular,
employment-related online commenting by its officials; the government feared what it
might uncover by a thorough and timely investigation; or the government’s
investigation was incompetent.238

Even the dissenting judge could not help but be appalled at the misconduct.239
g. Law review articles.
Scholars’ and experts’ critiques of OPR’s performance have appeared
in law journals for more than a decade.240

237
969 F. Supp. 2d 518, 537 (E.D. La. 2012) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted),
aff’d, No. 13-31078, 2015 WL 4925029 at *19 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015); accord Kozinski,
supra note 5, at xxxii (“In my experience, the U. S. Justice Department’s Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) seems to view its mission as cleaning up the reputation of prosecutors
who have gotten themselves into trouble.”).
238
United States v. Bowen, 799 F.3d 336, 358 (5th Cir. 2015).
239
Id. at 365 (“The government attorneys acted deplorably in this case, and their
punishment has been unconscionably mild.”).
240
See Davis, supra note 58, at 294–96; Green, supra note 54, at 85–87; Bruce A. Green,
Regulating Federal Prosecutors: Let There Be Light, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 156, 157–
60 (1996); Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 421–22 (1996); Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for
Professional Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS,
1083, 1109–11 (1994); Williams, supra note 60, at 3474–75; Zacharias & Green, supra note
170, at 16 n.75.
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h. Conclusion.
In light of the above, we agree that there exists an appearance that
lawyers who serve in OPR and the PMRU are neither independent nor
unbiased, and therefore should not be responsible for oversight of the conduct
of federal prosecutors. We take this position being aware that the appearance
may not reflect reality. But whatever the facts, OPR lawyers are obviously
saddled with the appearance of conflicts of interest. In contrast, the IG
functions without those conflicts, and has a reputation for independence.241
Accordingly, we recommend that Congress or the Attorney General take
the necessary steps to delegate to the OIG the responsibility for investigating
and reporting on allegations of misconduct by federal prosecutors, as
embodied in a recently-introduced bill to amend the Inspector General Act of
1978.242
G. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO FEDERAL AND STATE
ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PROMULGATE CODES OF PROFESSIONAL
AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT

This recommendation is addressed to the federal and state supreme
courts, and other entities that recommend and draft rules relating to judicial
and lawyer conduct. To insure that all lawyers and judges, state and federal,
are required to report their knowledge of serious lawyer misconduct, we
recommend and urge that, to the extent necessary, the applicable codes be
written to mandate the reporting of serious lawyer misconduct to disciplinary
authorities as follows:
(1) For state court lawyers and federal prosecutors. We recommend that
every state supreme court that has not already done so243 adopt the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 8.3 as written, with the
mandatory “shall.”
(2) For state court judges. We recommend that every state supreme court
that has not already done so244 adopt the Model Revised Judicial Code with
the mandatory word “shall.”

241

This is dramatically illustrated by the Inspector General’s repeated, direct
confrontations with the Attorney General over replacing OPR with OIG to investigate federal
prosecutors. See supra notes 214–222 and accompanying text.
242
Inspector General Access Act of 2015, S. 618, 114th Cong. (2015) (eliminating a
provision of the original Act that requires referral of allegations of misconduct involving DOJ
personnel to the OPR, thus allowing the DOJ IG to investigate those allegations).
243
See Appendix, § 1, infra, for a list of these states.
244
See Appendix, § 2, infra, for a list of these states.
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(3) For federal judges. We recommend the Federal Judicial Conference
provide for mandatory reporting to both the Department of Justice and the
local state disciplinary body. We use the word “mandatory” to ensure that
reporting be required rather than permissive. We believe it best if the
Conference uses Judicial Code Rule 2.15245 as written for all federal courts.
(4) Several commentators have recommended the creation of specific
ethical rules for prosecutors that reflect their unique role as both advocates
and seekers of justice.246 Prosecutors have broad discretion whether to
prosecute, and are often faced with difficult choices regarding whether to
indict or decline prosecution, especially in cases that achieve public notoriety
or those in which evidence of guilt does not reach the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Suggestions for the formulation of standards with
greater specificity, and clearer ethical rules, are contained in several
thoughtful law review articles.247 We recommend they be given serious
consideration by national and state supreme courts and bar associations.
H. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL
ORGANIZATIONS THAT REPRESENT JUDGES, PROSECUTORS, AND
DEFENSE LAWYERS

This recommendation is directed to organizations, state and federal,
local and national, that represent prosecutors, defense lawyers, bar
disciplinary bodies, and the profession in general.248 These highly-respected
organizations are well-positioned to advocate for cultures of integrity, for the
adoption of written policies, and for compliance with the Professional Rules
and Judicial Code. Their publications and training should emphasize the
responsibilities of prosecutors and defense lawyers—line assistants as well
as supervisors—to comply with the standards of the legal profession, and the
obligation to report to disciplinary authorities when they become aware of
serious misconduct on the part of their peers.

245

JUDICIAL CODE Canon 2, r. 2.15(B).
Joy supra note 60, at 418–420; Williams, supra note 60, at 3478–79.
247
E.g., Joy supra note 60, at 418–420; Williams, supra note 60, at 3478–79.
248
To name a few examples: the American Bar Association, state bar associations, the
National Center for State Courts, the Federal Bar Association, the National Bar Association,
the National Organization of Bar Counsel, the National District Attorneys Association, the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the American Judicature Society.
246
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I. RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED TO LAW SCHOOLS

In many areas, especially in populous cities, the criminal practice is
divided between lawyers who handle “white collar” cases for wealthy
corporations and individuals (or lesser offenses for their relations) who are
able to pay substantial hourly rates, and those who serve in public defender
offices representing indigent defendants, who make up the population of
most criminal defendants.249 Accordingly, we have included
recommendations directed to the nation’s law schools. We concur with
Professor John M. Levy’s statement from years ago:
The significance of teaching professional responsibility in law school should be more
than merely to enlarge the meaning of “thinking like a lawyer” to include the ability to
spot and analyze ethical issues. In educating students to be professionals, the law school
has an impact on how the person will ultimately behave in that role. 250

Lara A. Bazelon, a professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, has
written a provocative article about the value of law school clinics to prepare
students for criminal practice.251 She includes thought-provoking examples
of lawyer misconduct in criminal cases, and the dilemmas posed by the rules
that require reporting professional misconduct.252 In the article, Professor
Bazelon argues that a significant portion of misconduct in criminal cases is
the product of poor or negligible training, especially in the intricacies of the
practice of criminal law.253 Her discussion calls to mind the remarks of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting in Connick v. Thompson: “One can qualify
for admission to the profession with no showing of even passing knowledge
of criminal law and procedure.”254 The Justice was referring to the situation
in Louisiana, but the remark undoubtedly applies to other states as well.

249
See, e.g., CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000)
(reporting that, in 1996, 82% of felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties were
represented by public defenders or appointed counsel).
250
Levy, supra note 100, at 99. In 2007, the California Commission on the Fair
Administration of Justice recommended “that law school courses in legal ethics and continuing
ethics education programs in legal ethics for prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges include
familiarity with the obligations to report misconduct and incompetent representation by
lawyers . . . to the California State Bar.” CAL. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 204, at 29. In
1970, an ABA Special Committee recommended: “The individual attorney’s responsibility to
report instances of misconduct as a necessary element of the self-policing privilege should be
stressed in law school so that it is impressed on the lawyer during his formative years.” ABA
REPORT, supra note 61 at 169.
251
Bazelon, supra note 185.
252
Id. at 392–94, 398 n.9, 400–03.
253
Id. at 408–25.
254
563 U.S. 51, 107 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Professor Bazelon provided the following additional statement, with
which we agree:
While it is true that prosecutor and defender offices have a responsibility to train and
continue to educate their lawyers, it is equally true that they deserve newly-minted
graduates who are thoroughly familiar with the applicable legal and ethical rules.
Familiarity does not mean a rote recitation of the applicable standards, but rather an
ability to apply the standards in [the] real world of high stakes practice. The argument
that law schools owe their students this kind of hands-on training has gained more force
in recent years, as the economic downt[ur]n has produced a glut of J.D.s in search of
jobs. Positions for new lawyers in federal and state prosecutor and defender offices are
becoming increasingly difficult to obtain in this era of austerity. I believe it is incumbent
upon all law schools to provide education that not only teaches the substance of the law,
but also introduces students to the kinds of skills [required for] the actual practice of
law and a real world knowledge of the applicable rules of professional ethics. Those
skills are essential to [students’] ability to get decently paying jobs, and more
importantly, to do those jobs with competence and integrity. I therefore recommend that
the Association of American Law Schools, and other similar organizations, add to their
agendas teaching substantive and procedural criminal law, and the thorny ethical issues
that often arise in that practice.255

CONCLUSION
Prosecutorial deviations from ethical standards have continued to result
in reversals of criminal convictions.256 Nevertheless, we firmly believe the
vast majority of prosecutors are ethical women and men who strive to achieve
justice. At the same time, we are dismayed at the small number of reported
incidents in which prosecutors, both state and federal, have been cited for
straying from the high standards of professional conduct imposed on them—
those who are elected or appointed to enforce the law. We cannot fathom why
255

Email from Lara A. Bazelon, Director, Loyola Project for the Innocent, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles, to Thomas P. Sullivan, Jenner & Block, Chicago, and Maurice Possley
(March 1, 2015) (on file with authors); see also MEDWED, supra note 177, at 33–34.
256
E.g., Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016) (per curiam) (non-disclosure of evidence
favorable to defendant); United States v. Dvorin, No. 15-10142, 2016 WL 1085744, at *10
(5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2016) (non-disclosure of evidence favorable to defendant; knowing use of
false testimony; reckless disregard of duties; vindictive prosecution); Zapata v. Vasquez, 788
F.3d 1106, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2015) (improper closing argument); United States v. Mahaffy,
693 F.3d 113, 127–34 (2d Cir. 2012) (non-disclosure of evidence favorable to defendants);
Betancourt v. Warden, 2016 WL 490285 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2016) (non-disclosure of
evidence favorable to defendant); McCoy v. Delaware, 112 A.3d 239, 266 (Del. 2015)
(improper cross examination of defendant); Starling v. Delaware, 130 A.3d 316 (Del. 2015)
(improper conduct during trial and in closing argument); Wright v. State, 67 A.3d 972, 994
(Del. 2014) (non-disclosure of evidence favorable to defendant); Cardona v. Florida, 185 So.
3d 514 (Fla. 2016) (improper cross examination and closing argument); Evans v. Florida, 177
So. 3d 1219, 1230–39 (Fla. 2015) (improper closing arguments); Crew v. Florida, 146 So. 3d
101, 107–11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (improper closing arguments).
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so many withhold exculpatory information, tamper with witnesses and
evidence, engage in improper courtroom conduct, and the like, only to, claim
that their failures were “harmless error” and therefore of no real or lasting
consequence when challenged. The very opposite is true: whether a
conviction is undone or not, the consequence is palpable—it is a stain on the
reputation of the entire legal profession.
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APPENDIX
THE STATUS OF LAWYER AND JUDGE
REPORTING RULES IN THE 50 STATES

1. Rules on lawyer reporting obligations.
All states except California have adopted the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Of those states that have adopted the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, all but two states have retained the word
“shall” in describing lawyers’ duty to report misconduct by other lawyers.
Georgia and Washington have substituted “should” for “shall.”
California has a single, narrow statutory provision on lawyers reporting
misconduct by lawyers. The California Business and Professions Code §
6068 provides that lawyers have a duty to self-report to the agency charged
with attorney discipline, in writing, within thirty days of the time the attorney
has knowledge of the reversal of a civil judgment against him based in whole
or in part upon misconduct, grossly incompetent representation, or willful
misrepresentation.
2. Rules on judicial reporting obligations.
As to judges, twenty nine states have adopted amendments based upon
the Revised Judicial Code. Most of these states have provisions regarding the
judicial reporting of lawyer misconduct that are substantially similar to
Model Rule 2.15. States that have not amended their codes of judicial conduct
based on the Revised Judicial Code also have provisions regarding the
judicial response to either misconduct or “unprofessional conduct” by a
lawyer. The relevant provisions in the codes of judicial conduct for some of
these states are substantially similar to the obligation contained in Model
Rule 2.15.
Although the judicial codes of all states have provisions regarding the
judicial response to misconduct or “unprofessional conduct” by a lawyer, not
all states require a judge to report misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary
authority. The states that do not impose this requirement can be placed into
two categories:
(1) States that use “should” or equivalent variation rather than “shall”:
Alabama
Delaware
Idaho
Kentucky
Louisiana
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Michigan
North Carolina
Virginia
Washington
(2) States whose code of judicial conduct has mandatory language, but
has other language in the same provision that does not require reporting to a
particular or “appropriate” disciplinary body. Most give judges discretion to
take “appropriate action.” The following states can be placed in this category:
Alaska
California
Florida
Maryland
Massachusetts
New York
Texas
Along with its judicial code, California also has a provision in its
Professions Code, § 6086.7, that requires courts to notify the State Bar of
orders of contempt against lawyers; when a judgment is modified or reversed
based on lawyer misconduct, incompetence or willful misrepresentation; or
when certain sanctions are imposed against a lawyer.
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